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I. INTRODUCTION
Two questions of constitutional theory preoccupied James Madison at the
Constitutional Convention: What "vice" most threatens the stability and
success of republics?' How can a constitution cure this republican "disease?"
As we develop in a companion piece, Madison offered compelling answers to
both questions.2 Regrettably, however, the other conveners largely ignored his
resulting proposals, leading Madison immediately after the Convention to
privately disown the constitution we assume today was his beloved progeny.3
Although the Civil War eventually forced the nation to heed Madison's first
insight-that the Republic could not survive without an effective assurance of
equal protection for minorities against local majority oppression- Madison's
second great insight-that only structural devices can afford effectual equal
protection-has been ignored to this day.
In this Article, however, we argue that recent sub-constitutional innovations
in governance and public administration bring the nation within reach of the
constitutional polity that Madison desired. To explain how Madisonian
governance mechanisms can solve the problem of equal protection, an
explanation Madison never convincingly provided his contemporaries, we rely
on the thinking of another home-grown practical philosopher who was ahead of
his time, John Dewey. Along the way, we cast aside some commonplace, but
incomplete notions of what Dewey thought and what his brand of pragmatism
means. 4 Unlike many recent and prominent revivalists of pragmatist rhetoric in
1. Madison prepared a memorandum on the eve of the Convention examining the "Vices" of
republican governments in general and in the thirteen states and the Confederation that he hoped the
conveners would address. See James Madison, The Vices of the Political System of the United States
(Apr. 1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 348 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds.)
(1975). Madison attributed four "vices" or "mortal diseases" to "the Legislative sovereignties of the
States"-the "multiplicity," "mutability," "injustice," and "impotence" of their laws. Id. at 353-57;
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 370;
Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Mar. 16, 1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
384; James Madison's Speech at the Convention (June 8, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 41
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds.) (1977). The third vice then became the one that Madison placed at the
core of his most famous Numbers 10 and 51 in The Federalist, namely, the mortal diseases bred of
faction. See JACK N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 51
(1990) (stating that it was Madison's "overriding conviction that factious majorities within the states
posed the greater danger to liberty" under the Articles). See also James S. Liebman & Brandon L.
Garrett, Madisonian Equal Protection, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 837, at Parts It-Ill (2004) [hereinafter
Madisonian Equal Protection].
2. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Parts II-III and Subsection IV.C.3.
3. Madison expressed his disappointment in a letter to Thomas Jefferson written during the last few
days of the Convention: "I hazard an opinion," he wrote, "that the plan should it be adopted will neither
effectually answer its national object nor prevent the local mischiefs which every where excite disgusts
agst the state governments." Letter to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 6, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 1, at 163-64. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at 889 n.235 and
accompanying text.
4. See discussion infra notes 54-57 discussing what from our perspective appears as a superficial
treatment of Dewey by many recent scholars.
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the legal academy who use pragmatism as a synonym for hands-off inaction in
the face of perceived impracticalities, we take Dewey's pragmatism to set out
not just a generally anti-formalist and realistic creed, but also an
experimentalist method that can be successfully and comprehensively applied
to modem administrative bodies to actively redress the fundamental equal
protection problems both Madison and Dewey identified. The result may
provide a means for overcoming disappointments of past struggles to
accomplish the equal protection Madison imagined, and in doing so surpassing
his expectations by transforming democratic institutions through participatory
community.
All of this begins with a recounting of Madison's theory of an "interior" or
structural equal protection, and second, his prescient criticisms of our current
"exterior" judicially enforced equal protection scheme. In the third Part, we
compare Madison's equal protection approach to a growing body of writing on
emerging "experimentalist" or public problem-solving administrative
structures, which may better embody a Madisonian approach. In Part IV, we
look to the experimentalist method of John Dewey for the pragmatic
explanation Madison himself never managed to provide-at least not to the
satisfaction of the other Framers-of how governance mechanics can inculcate
a disposition towards equal protection and towards interdepartmental
cooperation. Part V then describes the diverse functioning of modem
experimentalist administrative innovations in a host of contexts ranging from
upgrading conditions in prisons and mental institutions to effective habitat
conservation and watershed management, and also how they instantiate
Deweyan experimentalism in ways his theorizing seventy years before, as the
modem administrative state was just taking shape, had never quite imagined.
Part VI uncovers the "proto-experimentalist" in Madison by showing how
experimentalism resonates with his equal protection approach. Part VII then
completes the circle, describing, respectively, the Madisonian equal protection
afforded by modem experimentalist mechanisms for reforming public school
reform and discouraging employment discrimination, with each suggesting
practical, desirable, and effective solutions for our Constitution that our
"external" judicially enforced scheme cannot provide. Part VIII concludes by
describing how experimentalist regimes better satisfy our past equal protection
commitments and also offer the hope that in the future we can rethink, adapt,
and improve equal protection norms through ongoing problem-solving and, in
doing so, redefine democratic institutions and community.
II. MADISONIAN, "INTERIOR" EQUAL PROTECTION
What "vice" most threatens the stability and success of republics?
Madison's answer was "injustice," meaning what we today call the denial of
equal protection. Republics effectively protect individual liberty, the "first
Vol. 22:261, 2004
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object of government," both from other individuals and from oppressive
government. But in doing so, they invite "oppression" by majority "factions"
against "minorities."5 Such "tyranny" is especially likely in smaller political
units-including in particular the American states and their municipalities.
6
Victims of tyranny may be members of any group that chronically finds itself
in the minority in those units, including, by Madison's reckoning, groups
defined religiously, racially, occupationally, and geographically.
7
How then can republican constitutions cure this republican "disease?" Here,
Madison's answer was constitutional mechanics, that is, structuring
5. As Madison vividly put it, "Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it
instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life,
because it nourishes faction than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal
life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961). In this same passage in The Federalist No. 10, Madison famously called
faction "the mortal disease[] under which popular governments have everywhere perished." Id. at 77;
see Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section I.B.
6. Madison wrote that in a "small ... sphere oppressive combinations may be too easily formed
against the weaker party." Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 214; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 5, at 83
(James Madison) ("the smaller the compass within which [individuals] are placed, the more easily will
they concert and execute their plans of oppression."). Before and during the Convention, Madison was
preoccupied with factional injustice in the States: Among those "evils which viciate the political system
of the U. S.," he wrote, the most "alarming" is the "Injustice of the Laws of the States." James Madison,
The Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON,
supra note 1, at 354. Cataloguing the States' "[i]nterferences" with "the security of private rights, and
[with] the steady dispensation of government," Madison rhetorically asked the Convention whether it
"[w]as... to be supposed that republican liberty could long exist under the abuses of it practiced in
some of the States?" Speech of James Madison at the Convention (June 6, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF
JAME§ MADISON, supra note 1, at 32. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection
III.B.2.
7. At the Convention, Madison identified race as perhaps the most virulent source of faction and the
oppression it invites: "We have seen the mere distinction of colour made in the most enlightened period
of time, a ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man." Speech of James
Madison at the Constitutional Convention (June 6, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note
1, at 33; see Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at 866 n.131, 867 nn.138-40, 868 nn.141-42
and accompanying text (discussing other evidence that Madison recognized race as an important source
of faction). As to occupational preferences, Madison objected to state legislation taking a position in
favor of one and against another occupation, because it interfered with "the free choice of occupations
by the people." James Madison, Essay on "Republican Distribution of Citizens" for THE NATIONAL
GAZETTE (Mar. 5, 1792), in 14 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 246 (Robert A. Rutland & Thomas Mason
eds.) (1983). From the beginning of his career in politics, Madison was a strong advocate of religious
toleration; as a delegate to Virginia's Constitutional Convention in 1776, he secured the replacement of
a provision in the proposed Virginia Declaration of Rights stating that "all men should enjoy the fullest
Toleration in the Exercise of Religion, according to the Dictates of Conscience" with a stronger
provision declaring that "all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion." RAKOVE, supra
note 1, at 13. As for geographic preferences, Madison was troubled on the eve of the Convention by a
proposal to allow Spain (then in possession of New Orleans) to close off the Mississippi to commerce
for five years in return for trade concessions, arguing that the burden this proposal placed on the citizens
of the "ultramontane" districts was so obviously great, and the benefits to the eastern districts so
obviously modest, that its supporters could have reached their position only illegitimately or
"unjustly"-by utterly ignoring the interests of the western districts. Letter from James Madison to
James Monroe (Oct. 5, 1786), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 140. See Madisonian
Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection II.B.2 (discussing Madison's treatment of each type of
discrimination).
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government to prevent unjust decisions from being made in the first instance.
In his view, the "interior" operation of government institutions had to habituate
public officials to think and to channel their behavior in virtuous, public-
minded directions. Such "impartial" decision making affords equal protection
where all interests-minority as well as majority-are taken into account.8
Madisonian constitutional mechanics may be considered from two
perspectives: that of public officials and "the people" whose virtue is being
induced and habituated, and that of the state and national institutions whose
interactions are structured to do that work while enabling both sets of
institutions to function effectively and justly.
From a human perspective, Madison's constitutional objective was to
"situate" individuals within institutions so that it was in their immediate and
"ambitious" interest to consider the interests of other persons and factions.
Through the exercise of competing, overlapping powers, these individuals
constrain others in adjacent institutions to behave in the same, "impartial"
manner. 9 In turn, the constancy of this "ethical situation,"' 0 the repeated
practice of behaving virtuously, and the recognition over the long run of the
beneficial effects of doing so, disposes officials to virtue, even though they
8. Madison opposed factional influences on public action, believing that they generated outcomes
contrary to the public good, meaning that they were "adverse" not only "to the rights of other citizens"
(i.e., "injustice"), but also "to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 5, at 78 (James Madison). As we discuss in Madisonian Equal
Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection IL.B.2, Madison's definition of the public good by reference to
the community's "aggregate interests" implies the view that, in ascertaining the public good, all the
interests that the members of the community pursue either singly or in groups ought to count for
something. Madison's view anticipates John Hart Ely's conception of public action undertaken
according to the principle of "equal concern and respect" in the sense that all interests count. JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 82 (1980) (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
180 (rev. ed. 1978)).
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 5, at 321-22 (James Madison); see Madisonian Equal
Protection, supra note 1, at Section III.A.
10. Here, as in prior writings, we borrow Drucilla Cornell's concept of "ethical situations." Drucilla
Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291, 294 (1985);
see James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "'All-Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM.
L. REv. 1463, 1608-14 (1990) (claiming that certain "all-out" school desegregation remedies worked
effectively by ethically situating citizens in what amounts to John Rawls' "original position," by
assuring that the effects of the citizens' political actions could not be aimed at privileging their own
children or harming previously discriminated-against classes of children and instead had to be directed
to the good of all; although courts facilitate the remedy, the remedy itself operates structurally by
placing political actors in situations in which it is in their self-interest to act accountably to citizens
across factional lines). For similar usage by The Federalist Papers, see THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra
note 5, at 81 (James Madison) ("the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be
rendered by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of
oppression."); THE FEDERALIST No. 72 (newspaper version); THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 5, at
443 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that the separation of powers functions in part according to the
principle that "[t]he oftener the measure is brought under examination, the greater the diversity in the
situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those errors which flow from
want of due deliberation."). For discussion of the recognition by Madison scholars of the importance of
constitutionally structured "situations," see Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at 855 nn.78-79
and accompanying text and Section III.A.
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were not initially so inclined.1" Finally, the example provided by officials who
undergo this process may inculcate similar actions and dispositions in the
people whom the officials represent.12 Artificially constructing these virtue-
creating "situations... incite[s] office-holders incidentally, but voluntarily, to
conform to the norms of their office" and may encourage people to adopt the
norms of citizenship in their public lives. 13 The imposition of these "ethical
situations" in turn may help make an economized republican fraternity possible
because it results from and reinforces each actor's recognition of her equality
with all others based on a shared interest in preserving the faculties of choice.
14
From an institutional perspective, the Madisonian desideratum is a
cooperative federalism-or in Robert Cover and Alex Aleinikoff's phrase a
"dialectical federalism"-with three attributes.1 5 First, the constitutional
structure assigns local legislators, who are more knowledgeable about local
conditions and closer to "the people," the myriad workaday matters of public
concern that are most of what concerns governments. 16 Second, the structure
requires local officials constantly to provide the national government with
information about the existence and range of possible responses to more
11. Madison is known for his hope to design and empower the various branches and levels of
government so that "[aimbition [is] made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be
connected with the constitutional rights of the place." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 5, at 322
(James Madison). What is less frequently remarked is that Madison's purpose in proposing such
mechanics was to turn representatives towards the public good. Madison gave a particularly detailed
account of how the structuring of government activity can over time form virtuous habits in The
Federalist Papers No. 57, which discusses the selection of members of the House. THE FEDERALIST No.
57, supra note 5, at 352 (James Madison) (noting that "the House of Representatives is so constituted as
to support in the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people"); see also
Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section III.A.
12. See SAMUEL BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 358-
59, 385-86 (1993); Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection IV.C.4.
13. BEER, supra note 12, at 284-85 (noting that Madison did not trust "'parchment barriers,"' i.e.,
"legal imperatives requiring conformity," and instead preferred to "use law to create situations which
would incite office-holders incidentally, but voluntarily, to conform to the norms of their office"). See
id. at 361 (discussing "the situation with which a republican constitution confronted the citizen
exercising his right to suffrage"); DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 196
(1984) ("Just as The Federalist shows how the ambitious can be expected to rule better and more safely
when placed in the situations which the structure of government create, it suggests similar benefits from
the situation in which the people themselves are placed.").
14. In a critical passage in The Federalist Papers No. 51, Madison describes how justice requires
that "the more powerful factions or parties be gradually induced.., to wish for a government which will
protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful." THE FEDERALIST No. 5 1, supra note 5, at
324-25 (James Madison). See id at 325 (contending that "[iln the extended republic of the United
States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a
majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and
the general good .. "); Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section III.B.
15. See Robert Cover & Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the
Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
16. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 5, at 83 (James Madison) ("The federal Constitution
forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the
national, the local and particular to the State legislatures."); id (distinguishing the "great and national
objects" of the national government from the "local circumstances and lesser interests" that prevail in
the state legislatures); see also BEER, supra note 12, at 292-93.
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momentous problems, and makes local officials available to administer the
solutions to those problems that the national government adopts.' 7 Finally, the
arrangements give national officials a duty of continuous umpireal review
of-but not command and control over-state legislation and administration.
18
This last attribute of Madisonian federalism is crucial to the first two. It helps
inculcate local actors with the extended national government's impartiality and
breadth of consideration while leaving local actors with day-to-day legislative
and administrative responsibility and putting their information and experience
at the disposal of the national government.1
9
Madison proposed two constitutional mechanisms for achieving these
goals. The first mechanism made it into the Constitution, but the second was
rejected by the other conveners. The half of Madison's positive program for
structuring equal protection into the daily mechanics of government that he did
manage to embed in the Constitution was "the extended republic of the United
States." Through this virtue-inculcating mechanism, Madison sought to locate
representatives of such a "great variety of interests, parties, and sects" together
in a single national law-making body that "a coalition of a majority of the
whole society [can] seldom take place on any other principles than those of
justice and the general good., 20 Doing so would alleviate the "danger to a
minor from the will of the major party" and, over time, make the interest-
generalizing consideration of the common good a habit.
21
Although this first part of Madison's solution was designed to dispose the
national government towards equal protection, it did not affect the states
where, in Madison's view, the far greater danger of majority oppression lay and
where injustices had chronically occurred under the Articles of Confederation.
In order to subject state legislators to a similar virtue-generating crucible,
Madison proposed the ill-fated second half of his program: a "Power of the
[National] Legislature to Negative State Law" in "all cases whatsoever."22
17. Madison "foresaw legislators from across the country pooling their knowledge of their home
state laws when drafting federal laws." BEER, supra note 12, at 306; see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 44,
supra note 5, at 287 (James Madison) (although "[tihe members of the federal government will have no
agency in carrying the state constitutions into effect[]," "[t]he members and officers of the State
governments, on the contrary will have an essential agency in giving effect to the federal Constitution").
Given Senators' and Representatives' access to "local knowledge of their respective districts,"
"considerable knowledge of [state] laws," and experience as members of state legislatures in the past or
"[e]ven at the very time" they were serving in Congress, Madison expected Congress to rely upon "local
information" and the "assistance of the State codes" in designing its own laws. THE FEDERALIST No. 56,
supra note 5, at 347-48 (James Madison).
18. As Madison predicted, "a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different
governments will control each other, at the same time as each will be controlled by itself." THE
FEDERALIST No. 51 supra note 5, at 323 (James Madison); see BEER, supra note 12, at 302.
19. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text; see also Madisonian Equal Protection, supra
note 1, at Subsection IV.C.4.
20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 5, at 325 (James Madison).
21. Id. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection IV.C.3.
22. Madison's June 8, 1787 Speech at the Convention, in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra
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Under this proposal, state legislation could not have gone permanently into
effect until Congress was given the chance to review and veto it based on the
same sorts of considerations that Congress would apply to proposed national
legislation. In typical Madisonian fashion, the "happy effect" of this device was
not mainly supposed to arise after the fact, when Congress exercised the
negative, but before the fact when state legislators imagined themselves in the
same interest-generalizing "situation" as national legislators in order to predict
how their proposals would fare under national review.23 Along with feedback
from state officials charged with collecting federal taxes and administering
other federal initiatives, the national negative was designed to make "local
information" and the "assistance of the State codes" routinely available to the
national government and to enable and encourage states to follow the results of
each others' experiments, including whether they passed congressional
muster.
24
The Framers adopted Madison's "extended republic" mechanism for
structuring equal protection into the actions and deliberations of the national
Congress, and Madison initially convinced his Virginia colleagues to include
his national negative in the Virginia Plan that otherwise was the blueprint for
the Constitution. The Framers then, however, spent the Convention chipping
away at, and finally outright rejecting, Madison's increasingly desperate efforts
to resuscitate the national veto. On one view, the conveners rejected the
national negative because they did not understand Madison's sophisticated
ideas about the uses of governance structure not only to constrain public
officials but also to habituate them to "equal protection" virtue, and not only to
check the states and the federal government by pitting each against the other
but also to induce a cooperative federalism in which states and the national
government would continually interact with and learn from each other.
Professor Kramer has recently made a convincing case, though, for the other
conveners' incomprehension of most of what Madison was driving at during
the Convention.25
Whether or not the other Framers understood Madison's argument, they
clearly did not believe that the national negative would work as he hoped. In
part, Madison's arguments may not have been particularly credible. He did
note I, at 41. The "all cases whatsoever" language (emphasis added) was Madison's frequent
description of the reach of the power to negative state laws that he wanted Congress to have. See, e.g.,
Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON,
supra note 1, at 383; see also Charles Pinckney's June 8, 1787 Motion at the Convention, in 10 PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 41 (proposing, in motion made on Madison's behalf, "that the
National Legislature shd. have authority to negative all Laws which they shd. Judge to be improper").
23. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 1, at 318. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection IV.C.3.
24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, supra note 5, at 347-48 (James Madison); see Madisonian Equal
Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection IV.C.4.
25. Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARv. L. REv. 611,647-71 (1999).
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sometimes seem to rely more on faith or a belief in constitutional magic as a
basis for predicting that the federal government would exercise its veto
cooperatively, not coercively, and for predicting that state officials would
imbibe the broadening influences of the "extended republic., 26 Although he
repeatedly admonished his colleagues that the national veto was the most
"necessary" component of any new constitution,27 they just as persistently
expressed their unwillingness to delay state action and paralyze federal
business while congressional review of local legislation was supposed to take
place and their distaste for the hammer they believed the veto would have given
Congress over the States.
28
And here again, there was much force to the conveners' concerns.
Undoubtedly, Madison's proposal was impractical-a problem that would only
have grown as the number of states and volume of state legislation increased.
Extending the negative beyond the "legislative acts of the States," to which
Madison's national negative was limited, so that it reached state administrative
regulations and policies, as almost certainly would have been necessary to
allow it to serve its purpose, would have pushed matters into the realm of the
impossible and still left much government action by "street-level bureaucrats"
beyond the veto's reach. Nor, whatever one thinks of "Our Federalism," is it
likely that a constitution with the negative in it would have survived the
ratification process, nor be palatable today, notwithstanding the nation's
acceptance of an ever-widening role for the national government.
There is, in addition, very good reason to believe that the negative would
have failed its purpose, even if it could have worked smoothly, while reaching
most or all state action. This is largely because Congress-the engine of
Madison's extended republic-has turned out to be more susceptible to
factionalism and less of a model of broadly focused law-making in the common
interest than had been hoped.29 As Madison himself feared would be the case,
26. For example, Madison downplayed his proposal for a negative as not coercive, but instead, "at
once the most mild & certain means of preserving the harmony of the System." James Madison, Speech
at the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at
102-03; see Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection IV.C.4.
27. James Madison's Speech at the Convention (June 8, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON,
supra note 1, at 41.
28. For a description of the concerns of the conveners, see Madisonian Equal Protection, supra
note 1, at Subsection IV.C.5. Gerry and Bedford were two of the strongest critics as to the negative's
practicality and the power it gave the federal government over the states. For example, "Bedford asked,
how the negative in practice could be used-would states upon enactment have to suspend all laws until
they would be sent seven or eight hundred miles away, undergo deliberation of a faroff Congress?
Would Congress have to then sit continually to undertake such review?" See 1 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 167 (Madison's notes, June 8, 1787) (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1937). Gerry feared that the negative "may enslave the states" and "will be abused," Id. at 165-66;
Bedford added, "[w]ill not these large States crush the small ones wherever they stand in the way of
their ambitious or interests views." Id. at 167.
29. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions
As Guardians ofIndividual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535-37, 539-40 (1986) (noting the link between
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particularly in the absence of the national veto and a second structural
protection he advocated but that the conveners rejected, a Council of Revision
to prevent unjust laws from being passed by Congress, 30 "[a] local spirit [has]
infallibly prevail[ed] much more in the members of Congress than a national
spirit [has] prevail[ed] in the legislatures of the particular states," and "the
members" of Congress have "too frequently displayed the character rather of
partisans of their respective States than of impartial guardians of a common
interest." 3 1 Recently, the Supreme Court has made matters worse by doubly
truncating the extended republic-narrowing the range of issues over which
Congress may exercise preemptive or joint responsibility vis-a-vis the States,
and forbidding Congress to require state officials to administer federal
programs. 32 In the light of experience, there is little assurance that Congress's
equal protection and Madison's "extended republic" but concluding that it took the Fourteenth
Amendment to achieve the needed protection); ELY, supra note 8, at 79-87 (1980) (linking Madison's
discussion of faction in The Federalist Papers to equal protection, but assuming that Madison expected
the "extended republic" by itself to solve the problem and implying Madison's lack of foresight with the
comment that "it didn't take long to learn that from the standpoint of protecting minorities [the
Constitution's safeguards were] not enough," id. at 80-81; arguing that the Equal Protection Clause as
interpreted by the Warren Court was "enough"). Madison was clearly aware of the possibility of
factional strife and control in the national legislature. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 5, at 296
(James Madison) ("A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress than a
national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States."). As happened with the national
veto, however, his proposed solution to the problem-a national council of legislative revision-was
defeated at the Convention. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at 913 n.363, 922 n.409,
965, n.657.
30. Madison proposed in the Virginia Plan creation of a panel composed of the chief executive and
a number of judges, empowered to overturn unwise congressional enactments unless Congress
overturned the veto by a two-thirds vote, and his hope in particular was that it would moderate
Congress's use of the negative and render it "more respectable." James Madison, Revisionary Power of
the Executive and the Judiciary (June 4, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 25.
Madison also argued his Council of Revision, modeled on New York's 1777 Constitution, would
provide "an additional check" against "unwise [and] unjust legislation" at the national level, James
Madison's Speech at the Convention (July 21, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at
109; would "introduce Checks, which will destroy the measures of an interested majority; and was "not
only necessary for [the nation's] own safety, but for the safety of a minority in Danger of oppression
from an unjust and interested majority, James Madison's Speech at the Convention (June 4, 1787), in 10
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 25 (King's notes). Madison's No. 48 in The Federalist
Papers describes Pennsylvania's appointment of a Council of Censors in 1783-84 which uncovered
persistent constitutional violations. See discussion of the Council of Revision proposal in Madisonian
Equal Protection, supra note 1, at 913 n.363, 922 n.409, 965 n.657.
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 5, at 296-97; see Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note
1, at 963 nn.645-48.
32. In an anti-Madisonian fashion, the Court has (1) diminished Congress's capacity under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to "enforce, by appropriate legislation," the assurance that the states
will afford persons the equal protection of the laws-in the process vastly broadening the scope of the
states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from private lawsuits to enforce federal statutes
barring discrimination and unfair practices by the States, see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 602, 619 (2000) (invalidating provisions of the Violence Against Women Act that authorized civil
law suits against the States by females victimized by crimes as a result of the State's under-enforcement
of their criminal laws, concluding that the provisions were an overbroad exercise of Congress' Section 5
power and thus an inadequate basis for abrogating the States' sovereign immunity); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526-29 (1997) (holding that Section 5 authorizes Congress to define remedies but
not to determine "what constitutes a Constitutional violation," a power the Court assigned exclusively to
itself); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (holding that only legislation properly enacted
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exercise of the veto would very consistently discipline state oppression of
minorities, or that state legislators who emulated the actions and thought
processes of our national representatives would often shed their parochial
tendencies.
More perfectly realizing Madison's vision of equal protection does not,
therefore, mean adopting his national veto as the twenty-ninth amendment to
the United States Constitution. But neither, for Madison's own reasons to
which we next turn, is the answer to rest on the laurels of the Radical
Republican's Equal Protection Clause or the Warren and Burger Court's burst
of equal protection enforcement during the 1960s and 1970s. Nor for that
matter is the answer to be found in more forceful admonition of public officials
to mind, and of courts to enforce, the existing Equal Protection Clause.
33
III. INEFFECTUAL, "EXTERIOR" EQUAL PROTECTION
In energetically promoting his "interior" solution to the republican vice of
majority oppression of minorities, Madison was equally adamant about how not
to design government operations to solve the problem. What would not suffice
were judicially enforced non-structural, or "exterior" admonitions to local
government officials to afford minorities the equal protection of the law.34 In
Madison's view-developed in detail in our companion article-judicially
policed "parchment barriers" by themselves are an "ineffectual" protection
against "this dreadful class of evils," the abuse of minority rights in the States.
Moreover, courts could never effectively bolster those barriers in large part
because courts are too disconnected from the public and its problems. 35 As a
result, Madison predicted, courts would be unwilling to intervene against, and
pursuant to Section 5 overcomes a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity); (2) narrowed Congress's
regulatory power under the Commerce Clause, delivering larger spheres of legislation into exclusive
state control, see Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 ; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995)
(invalidating the Gun Free School Zones Act on the ground that it exceeded Article I Commerce Clause
power); and (3) forbidden Congress to require the assistance of state and local officials in enforcing
federal law, see Printz v United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (invalidating provisions of the Brady
gun control law that required state and local governmental officials to assist in executing a federal
statutory requirement of background checks for prospective buyers of firearms); New York v United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (invalidating "take-title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act finding that it unconstitutionally compelled States to enact regulatory legislation). See
generally Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Part VI (discussing these and allied decisions).
33. See infra Part II.
34. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 5, at 320 (James Madison) (describing "exterior"
constraints as "inadequate"); Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section III.A.
35. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 295, 297 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds.) (1977) ("repeated violations of these parchment
barriers have been committed by overbearing majorities in every State"); Letter from James Madison to
Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 6, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 163-64 ("not
effectual"); see Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section III.A. Madison's reference to the
"dreadful class of evils" besetting the nation is in a speech he delivered at the Convention. See 1
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 318-19 (Madison's notes, June 19,
1787).
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instead would be tempted to seek favor with, the States and their popular
majorities. And even in rare moments when courts do side with minorities
against popular majorities, they are inaccessible to many litigants; rely too
much on "cloudy," "dim and doubtful" words on "parchment" for their own
guidance and for inculcating virtue among tyrannically inclined majorities; and
have only a weak capacity to enforce their judgments in the face of majoritarian
resistance.
36
The solution Madison rejected is of course the one the Constitution adopts.
The first Constitution took some halting steps in this direction by attempting to
list and ban the worst majoritarian excesses of the state governments under the
Articles of Confederation: bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, denial of
privileges and immunities to residents of other states, and the impairment of
contracts either directly or by debasing the currency and undermining creditor
rights through the coinage of money and issuance of bills of credit. 37 The
second Constitution then tried to make the ban on unjust state action more
general and comprehensive through the enactment of the Due Process,
Privileges and Immunities, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Moreover, federal courts did attempt for a time during the Civil Rights era
to serve as the neutral "intermediate institution" between majorities and
minorities that Madison himself acknowledged might serve as a back-up, after-
the-fact solution to the problem of republics in the absence of an "interior"
solution like his national negative. 38 And at first, the courts succeeded
36. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 295, 297 (referencing parchment barriers); THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 5, at 229
(concluding that the inaccuracy of words or phrases "unavoidabl[y]" increases as they are applied to
more complex ideas); see Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at 936 nn.491-493 and
accompanying text.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I ("No state shall.., coin money; emit bills of credit; make
anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto
law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts."); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I ("The citizens of each
state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states."). These
constraints targeted several of the abuses with which Madison charged state legislatures in his writings
before the Convention. See James Madison, The Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr.
1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 348 (discussing States' trespasses against each
other and the rights of their own citizens by, for example, issuing paper money and impairing contracts
between debtors and creditors). The dormant commerce clause also protects out-of-state economic
interests against discriminatory or abusive regulation by local majority factions. See 3 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (speech of Madison) (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937)
(explaining that this protection afforded by the incipient constitution "grew out of the abuse of the power
by the importing States in taxing the non-importing [States], and [was] intended as a negative and
preventive provision against injustice among the States themselves, rather than as a power to be used for
the positive purposes of the General Government").
38. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1288-1302 (1976); Colin Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural
Change in Public Litigation, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 46 (1979); Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell,
The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Reform Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 467-72
(1980); Owen Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-5 (1979); William Fletcher, The
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brilliantly, ending such blatantly retrogressive tyrannies as rural southern
apartheid and feudally operated prisons.39 When, however, the courts faced
more nuanced conditions embedded in complex, modem institutions, their
ambitious decrees fell outside their areas of competence, enabling affected
majorities to attack the courts' already fragile legitimacy.4 ° In order to hold
elected officials, powerful bureaucracies, and entire constituencies liable for
serious violations, judges had to give "cloudy" constitutional provisions more
breadth and solidity than had ever previously been recognized. To remedy the
violations, inexpert judges had to devise broad affirmative injunctions with
only a "dim and doubtful" connection to the violation and its demonstrable
41harms. The "public interest" the decrees pursued lacked overt democratic
validation and relied instead on expert opinions and "special masters." The
mandated programs had to be implemented by recalcitrant administrators, or by
willing but politically wary officials whose support could only be
•. 42
surreptitious. To the limited extent that office-holders and "the people" were
engaged in the process, they were antagonists and adversaries, not partners and
objects of virtuous habituation.
The result was as Madison predicted. Office-holders and their powerful
constituencies revolted. In response, politically undefended courts quickly
declined to extend the logic of their decisions to adjacent contexts, interposed
inflexible obstacles to access and relief for aggrieved minorities, and finally
abandoned ameliorative doctrines and decrees altogether.4 3 More recently, the
Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 695-97
(1982); Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section V.A.
39. See James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The
Emerging Model of School Governance And Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183
(2003-2004) [hereinafter Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory]; Charles F. Sabel & William Simon,
Destabilization Rights: How The New Public Law Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1015, 1034-43. In regard
to dramatic reduction of school segregation in the rural South see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE
COURTS 383-91 (1994).
40. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 78-79 (1995) (describing a dearth of evidence of
progress toward the district court's goal of closing the achievement gap between white and black
children following a decade of remedial orders costing billions of dollars); Liebman & Sabel, Public
Laboratory, supra note 39, at 196-201 (discussing federal courts' increasing reluctance to address the
thornier questions desegregation presented when litigation moved from the rural South to urban areas,
particularly in the North and West); ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE:
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 117-38, 153-61 (2003); Sabel & Simon, supra note
39, at 1017-19; see also DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 3 (1987) (arguing that "the salvation of racial equality has eluded us again"); Madisonian Equal
Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection V.B.I and accompanying text; GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE 9, 28 (1991) (describing how federal courts and the Supreme Court halted their efforts to
combat discrimination, debunking the view that the Supreme Court and federal courts were instrumental
in securing civil rights, and questioning whether courts are an effective means of securing change).
41. See Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 39, at 196-201; Sabel & Simon, supra
note 39, at 1016-52.
42. For these and other criticism of the federal courts' use of structural remedies, see sources cited
supra notes 39-40.
43. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362 (1996) (reversing prison order as
"inordinately-indeed, wildly-intrusive"); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 83-90 (condemning, as
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Supreme Court has even resisted efforts by Congress and other
instrumentalities of the extended republic to adopt and enforce their own,
democratically validated, protections for local minorities against States.
Instead, the modem Court has truncated Madisonian dialectical federalism by
placing a number of assertedly "local" issues off limits to the national
government and by forbidding the national government to require state officials
to help administer federal programs. 4 In short, a system of judicially enforced
admonitions usually cannot operate-and the system we have had since the
Civil War typically has not operated-in an effective Madisonian fashion that
places public actors in situations that inspire them to adopt and apply the norms
of impartiality and equal concern.4 5
What, then, would more perfectly realized Madisonian equal protection
require? In the remainder of this Article, we argue that, given recent
innovations in federal-state administrative arrangements, matters may have not
turned out as badly in the negative's absence as Madison feared, nor so much
worse than might have been the case had his impractical and under-inclusive
negative been adopted. On the contrary, emerging administrative structures
vastly beyond the district court's remedial powers, a plan to desegregate the Kansas City schools by
inducing white suburban children to transfer voluntarily into the city district); City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112 (urging "restraint in the issuance of injunctions against state officers engaged in
the administration of the States' criminal laws"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979)
(disapproving orders that "enmeshed [lower courts] in the minutiae of prison operations"); Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) (suggesting that federal courts should avoid ongoing intrusion into the
policies of state law enforcement agencies; "the principles of equity, comity, and federalism must...
restrain a federal court" (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972)); O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488 (1974) (denying relief on ripeness grounds and stating that federal court monitoring of
state courts would violate principles of federalism); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that
federal courts must generally dismiss suits for equitable relief against pending state criminal
proceedings); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J.) ("it is not the role of the courts, but
that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with
the laws and the Constitution."). See also Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection
V.B.1.
44. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. The Court continues to allow Congress to make state
assistance in administering federal programs a quid pro quo for the States' receipt of federal funds and,
of course, permits' States' otherwise voluntary agreement to participate in carrying out federal
initiatives. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (noting that conditions Congress
imposes on States in conjunction with the receipt of federal monies are constitutional as long as they
"bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending"); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
206 (1987) ("Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds") (upholding federal statute
conditioning receipt of federal highway funds on state adoption of minimum drinking age); see also
infra notes 169-171 and accompanying text (discussing conditional preemption). To that substantial
extent, the cooperative federalism that Madison envisioned taking place through state administration of
federal programs remains a central part of the modern administrative state.
45. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section V.B. For a discussion of why certain
school desegregation decrees, which imposed what amounted to political, not institutional, remedies
provide an exception to this rule, see Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 39, at 195-201;
Liebman, supra note 10, at 1614-44; JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 80-82 (1984); Colin Diver, The Judge as Political
Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979);
JEFFREY RAFFEL, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: THE METROPOLITAN REMEDY IN
WILMINGTON 120-53,208-17 (1980).
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may both instantiate and elaborate equal protection norms and remedies
through interaction, oversight and coordination among federal, state, local, and
private actors. In the process, this "democratic experimentalism" arguably takes
a new and promising step-by way of the pragmatism of John
Dewey-towards a modernized Madisonian equal protection.
IV. TOWARD AN EXPERIMENTALIST APPROXIMATION OF MADISONIAN EQUAL
PROTECTION
Madison may have been the first, but he was by no means the only
American constitutional architect whose equal protection accomplishments fell
short of his ambitions. In Madison's case, his imagination outran that of his
more practical colleagues at the Convention, who rejected his unwieldy
negative.46 Eighty years later, it was the imagination of the Radical
Republicans that failed them, and in the years since, so has that of the federal
judges on whom their Equal Protection Clause placed much of the interpretive
responsibility.47
In considering whether a solution to the equal protection problem is
available that is more realistic than Madison's veto and more effectual than the
Radical Republican's Equal Protection Clause, we accept Madison's view of
local majority oppression of minorities as the central republican "disease" and
structural ("interior"), not admonitory ("exterior") equal protection as its
"cure."
We deviate, however, from the more extravagant aspects of Madison's
proposal to use the legislative veto to provide equal protection to local
minorities. Our goal is to avoid not only the practical objections to the veto
raised at the Convention but also the difficulty under modern conditions of
public life of installing Madisonian mechanics in a partly non-Madisonian
constitutional system managed by a downright anti-Madisonian Supreme
48Court. With a conceptual boost from John Dewey, we conclude that a
constellation of "experimentalist" administrative and remedial innovations
taking place throughout the nation can approximate Madisonian equal
protection without wrenching practical difficulty or formal constitutional
amendment.
By "experimentalist" innovations, we mean a variety of administrative
arrangements characterized by continuous, interactive cycles of local
46. On July 17, 1787, the Convention voted down Madison's national negative and immediately
thereafter, as an acknowledged substitute more palatable to state interests, unanimously approved a
Supremacy Clause. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 28 (Madison's notes, July 17,
1787) (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) . The debates over Madison's national negative proposal are
discussed in detail in Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection IV.C.5.
47. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Part VI.
48. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Part VI; supra notes 32, 44.
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innovation and central monitoring. A growing body of writing identifies
contemporary administrative contexts, ranging from environmental protection
and educational reform to regulation of police discretion and control of
workplace sexual harassment, where "experimentalist" or "public problem-
solving" regimes of this sort are operating. 49 Most of this writing offers
evidence that these innovative arrangements can achieve public regulatory
49. E.g., ARCHON FUNG ET AL., CAN WE PUT AN END TO SWEATSHOPS? (2001) (advocating a
system of competitive self- and third-party monitoring of overseas working conditions by corporations
operating global supply chains); Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) [hereinafter Doff and Sabel, Democratic
Experimentalism] (describing the potential role of democratic experimentalism in resolving difficult
questions of constitutional interpretation); Joshua Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Sovereignty and Solidarity:
EU and US, in GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN A NEW ECONOMY: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN
EXPERIMENTS 691, 694-95 (Jonathan Zeitlin & David Trubeck eds.) (2003) [hereinafter Governing
Work], available at http://
web.mit.edu/polisci/research/cohen/sovereigntyandsolidarityEU and US.pdf; Michael C. Dorf &
Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831
(2000) [hereinafter Doft & Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts] (discussing recent innovations in the use of
court-monitored treatment plans for drug addicted offenders); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance
in the Administrative State, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1997); Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial
Profiling, 33 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 41 (2001) (advocating a system in which police departments
use community partnership, monitored information collection, and problem-solving as a means of
combating racial profiling); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001) [hereinafter
Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation] (championing the systematic use of performance
monitoring and benchmarking as regulatory tools in the environment and other areas); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Environmental Performance, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002) [hereinafter Karkkainen, NEPA] (proposing that NEPA be retooled as a
means of progressively redefining government projects to moderate their environmental effects to the
extent currently possible); James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act
and the Post-Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703 (2003) [hereinafter Liebman &
Sabel, NCLB] (claiming that the No Child Left Behind Act is part of a national "new accountability"
movement for school reform that potentially could supplant Brown v. Board of Education as the model
for institutional reform and achievement of effective education); Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory,
supra note 39, (describing how a combination of movements towards standards, changing goals of
desegregation and school finance litigation, and state and federal legislation, have converged to create a
promising experimentalist framework for school reform); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the
Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551
(1997) (exploring the uses of community-based planning and monitoring as a method of managing
police discretion); Sabel & Simon, supra note 39 (describing an evolution in public law remedies from
injunctive command-and-control regulation towards experimentalist remedies that permit collaboration,
flexibility, and ongoing learning); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) (advocating a multi-tiered and interactive
"regulatory" framework that makes use of employee participation, problem-solving and ongoing
monitoring to remedy often informal patterns of employment discrimination); Note, After Sandoval:
Judicial Challenges and Administrative Possibilities in Title VI Enforcement, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1774
(2003) (proposing that administrative enforcement of Title VI be used to establish an experimentalist
regime for improving the protection of the civil rights of minorities affected by federally funded
programs). See generally William H. Simon, Solving Problems v. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist
Challenge to Legal Liberalism (forthcoming 2004) (describing a new school of pragmatist thought that
advocates carefully monitored problem-solving, in lieu of the announcement and enforcement of fixed
entitlements, as the most effective means of reforming social institutions and responding to the needs of
disadvantaged communities); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 448-50 (2003) (describing "[v]arious forms of flexible agency-stakeholder
networks for innovative regulatory problem-solving [that] have been developed in order to avoid the
limitations of top-down command regulation and formal administrative law procedures").
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objectives that are beyond the grasp of bureaucratic, "public law" and market
solutions. We conclude that these new arrangements-which we associate with
John Dewey's twentieth century version of Madisonian cooperative
federalism-also may achieve a more perfect equal protection than Madison's
negative could have supplied and than the Fourteenth Amendment has
supplied. Operating without formal constitutional amendment, and without the
gridlock that Madison's negative would have produced, these new
arrangements may help establish the constitution-and the equality-that
Madison and the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment had sought but failed to
achieve.
By characterizing these arrangements as "Madisonian," we mean two
things. First, we mean that the regimes are animated from within by his equal
protection principle and are capable of instilling office-holders and the public
with his brand of virtue. Second, we refer to a cooperative as opposed to a
separated-spheres version of federalism. The constitutional structure Madison
envisioned thus was neither a top-down national hierarchy connecting a center
and thirteen subservient instrumentalities nor a bottom-up confederacy of
thirteen independent States that occasionally conferred authority on a central
body to act in their collective behalves. Instead, Madison imagined continuous
state-federal-state interaction running both ways between thirteen productively
diverse States with design and implementation responsibilities and a center
with oversight responsibility. Although each State and the center needed the
other's support to carry out those responsibilities, the concurring entity could
not dictate the content of the responsible entity's actions. In carrying out its
responsibilities, however, each entity had strong incentives to compare each
target State's situation and proposed action to those of the other States to
determine, based on thirteen or more actual experiences, the range of effective
courses of action and (roughly speaking) the boundaries of a collectively
indicated common good.
More concretely, the extended republic was designed to enable States to
grant or withhold their support from the center through their influence with
local citizens and factions who would have to coalesce with large groups of
others elsewhere to mobilize a majority in the extended Republic's Congress.50
50. Although Madison originally opposed the idea, the Convention gave the States substantial say
in the national government by giving them equal representation in the Senate and allowing state
legislatures to appoint those senators. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at 913 n.364. On
the power of the States to shape national policy, see id. at Part V.B; THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note
5, at 297-98 (James Madison):
The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the
officers of the Union; the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments
created by legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions, would oppose,
in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a large State, very serious
impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison,
would present obstructions which the federal government would hardly be willing to
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Through the national negative-or, we will argue, other less invasive devices-
the center would give or withhold its support from the States without, however,
being able to dictate alternative action or inaction. If these interlocking
structures of action and concurrence (or objection) worked as Madison
imagined, they would lead the national government, in marshalling support for
its own initiatives, to attend to the interests of each of the States and their
majority factions. In monitoring action by States, national legislators would
model and apply their broadly focused sense of the general good as informed
by individual practices and the collective going rate among the States. In
granting or withholding their support for national initiatives, individual and
allied groups of States would protect the interests of their majority factions. But
in so designing their own initiatives, they would leaven proposals driven by
their and their majority faction's particular needs, resources, and ideas. They
would do this based on what they saw working (or at least avoiding Congress's
veto) in the other states, and also by internalizing the more encompassing view
of the common interest that they could expect Congress to use in reviewing
their actions.
Finally, by contending only that these regimes "approximate" Madison's
constitutional objectives, we mean that modem arrangements accomplish the
equal protection and cooperative federalism that Madison imagined through
mechanisms that are different from his national negative and, we think, that are
more practical and less threatening to the States and can be achieved without
constitutional amendment. Rather than requiring a choice between the
legislature and the courts, moreover, "experimentalist" schemes invite the
interactive participation of all state and national actors-legislators, judges,
executive and administrative officers, and citizens. What these already up-and-
going regimes provide, therefore, is an interactive federalism without a
constitutional cataclysm. What Madison's thinking offers these regimes is a
constitutional mission: the equal protection of the laws.
encounter.
See also Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 215, 215, 287-93 (2000); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 543 (1954); cf John C. Yoo, Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1398-
401 (1997) (doubting the effectiveness of some of the structural devices identified in Wechsler, supra,
as safeguards for the State's "institutional" interests insofar as they differ from the "popular interests" of
the voters who elect the members of Congress but acknowledging the States' ability to protect their
interests by directly lobbying Congress and the President).
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V. EXPERIMENTALISM: A DEWEY-INFLECTED INTRODUCTION
A. John Dewey as Sociable Madisonian
Modem "democratic experimentalism" or "public problem-solving" 51 may
be associated with the pragmatism of John Dewey,52 particularly his 1927
classic The Public and Its Problems.53 This "democratic experimentalist"
dimension of Dewey's thought should be distinguished from much of the
current academic fashion that has revived interest in pragmatism and Dewey's
pragmatism. 54 Leading figures such as Judge Richard Posner have taken to
calling their conclusions pragmatist, and typically what they mean is
"pragmatism" in the everyday sense of the word, that is, a practical, non-
foundational mindset. Posner, for example, simply calls' pragmatist an
invitation to judges to decide cases flexibly and with reference to consideration
of social consequences.55 Though an academic turn towards pragmatic modes
51. See, e.g., Dorf& Sabel, Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 49, at 288-91; Garrett, supra
note 49, at 125-40; Sturm, supra note 49, at 462-64.
52. See Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 39, at 227 (associating experimentalism
with Dewey but noting that Leo Tolstoy actually anticipated its application to public education more
fully than Dewey himself, despite the latter's well-known focus on that domain); Michael C. Dorf, Legal
Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 875, 884-85 (2003); Charles F. Sabel,
Design, Deliberation, and Democracy: On the New Pragmatism of Firms and Public Institutions, at
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/Design.html (discussing pragmatism and democratic
experimentalism); William H. Simon, Solving Problems Versus Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist
Challenge to Legal Liberalism (2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing legal
pragmatist and democratic experimentalist scholarship); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem
Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943,
957-60 (2003) (describing relationship of pragmatism and work of John Dewey to new approaches to
ecosystem management); see also Karkkainen, NEPA, supra note 49, at 907 n.l I (gently criticizing
much of what passes for modem legal pragmatism).
53. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927).
54. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003) [hereinafter
POSNER, LAW]; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 227-310
(1999) [hereinafter POSNER, PROBLEMATICS]; THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL
THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998); Symposium, The Revival of Pragmatism,
18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1996); Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal
Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72
MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988). For an excellent treatment of the implications of John Dewey's thinking for
modem theory of the liberal state, that pre-dates the recent revival, see Robin L. West, Liberalism
Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. PiTr. L. REV. 463 (1985). The revival
includes scholars on all sides of the political spectrum, and in very different areas of scholarly
specialization. See Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 410 (1990) ("[I]t
seems only a slight exaggeration to suggest that a movement which five years ago included almost no
one today appears to embrace virtually everyone."); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Pragmatism in U.S. Legal
Theory: Its Application to Normative Jurisprudence, Sociolegal Studies, and the Fact- Value Distinction,
41 Am. J. JuRIS. 315, 316 (1996) ( "Prominent representatives of the left, center, and right in U.S. legal
theory-of critical legal studies, critical feminism, critical race theory, law and economics, and of the
mainstream--scholars who otherwise hold sharply divergent opinions about law, have begun to assert
that pragmatism points the way.")
55. Posner, for example, is one of the prominent advocates for a retum to Dewey's thinking, and he
presents an extended discussion of Dewey's work in Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, supra note 54,
at 97-129, which we do not substantially disagree with by way of summarizing Dewey's writing. Our
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of thinking may be noteworthy and beneficial, we are not interested here in
such general rhetoric of pragmatism, nor pragmatism as a philosophical
56
approach. More troubling from the pragmatic perspective than theoretical
coherence of such views is that such debate ignores the substance and modem
application of Dewey's actual experimental method that we submit was at the
heart of his thinking.57 As Bradley Karkkainen writes of the scholarship,
putting it generously, where Dewey believed in a "dynamic, experimental,
iterative, and adaptive problem-solving approach," "Dewey's pragmatism is
more experimental and adaptive than many other variants currently in
circulation. ''58 As will become clear, the project of democratic experimentalism
departure is from conclusions as to judicial pragmatism, which is Posner's focus throughout. Posner
concludes that Dewey's method suggests judges should behave in a "pragmatic" manner, by flexibly and
eclectically taking into account social consequences, and leaving social experimentation to the other
branches. See id at 22-23, 122-29. Critics have contended Posner's approach is inconsistent, far
removed from philosophical pragmatism, and generally lacks substance beyond an everyday use of the
word "pragmatism" as distrust for impractical philosophical theory. See, e.g. David Luban, What's
Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism?, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 43-50 (1996); David Luban, The Posner
Variations (Twenty-Seven Variations on a Theme by Holmes), 48 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1006-20 (1996).
Posner offers discussion of how Bush v. Gore and other recent decisions can be justified on pragmatic
terms, risking some appearance of the results-orientation he criticizes. POSNER, LAW, supra note 54, at
213-49, 322-56. The inadequacy from a pragmatic perspective, though, is that Posner offers little by way
of suggesting how democratic institutions could meaningfilly engage in participatory, Deweyan
experimentation, or what role law could play except by keeping its hands off-though he does suggest
that judges should be a more diverse body. Id. at 119, 128, 354. Posner fails to define a more positive or
participatory vision of democratic experimentation, despite statements that many legal academics fail to
appreciate Dewey's concern for such experimentation. See id at 122. Posner, perhaps correctly, as
discussed infra note 104 and accompanying text, notes the same defect in Dewey and believes Dewey
fell short when writing about law and policy, noting Dewey's "paradoxical lack of engagement with
concrete problems and real institutions." Id. (discussing Dewey's short essay Logical Method and Law,
10 Cornell Q. 17 (1924)). Posner fails to cite or discuss, however, any of the burgeoning body of
"democratic experimentalist" work, supra notes 49, 52. Such scholarship, of which this piece is a part,
intends to take Dewey's thinking and method beyond the level of philosophical or judicial rhetoric and
instead, in a meaningful and comprehensive way, suggests ways that Dewey's experimental method can
be put into public administrative practice in real institutions, perhaps in ways that Posner is correct that
Dewey "barely imagined." See Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 39.
56. The academy has been beset by long, fairly unproductive debates as to what such use of
pragmatist thinking means, if anything. See, e.g., Catharine Pierce Wells, Pragmatism, Feminism, and
the Problem of Bad Coherence, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1645, 1648 (1995) ("It is sometimes easier to describe
what pragmatism rejects than to identify its affirmative claims."); Gene R. Shreve, Rhetoric,
Pragmatism and the Interdisciplinary Turn in Legal Criticism-A Study ofAltruistic Judicial Argument,
46 AM. J. COMP. L. 41, 57 (1998) ("The philosophical community has never arrived at a settled
definition of 'pragmatism.' Nor have legal scholars been able to agree what they mean when they
appropriate pragmatism. Nor have scholars been able to agree whether or how pragmatism in legal
theory differs from philosophical pragmatism."); Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional
Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 593, 596 (1999) (contrasting different forms of legal and philosophical
pragmatism).
57. Dewey was a persistent critic of "refuge in academic specialism, comparable in its way to what
is called scholasticism." DEWEY, supra note 53, at 167, 168. One of the projects of democratic
experimentalism is to try to reorient the academy towards research into new forms of institutional
architecture, enabling both teachers and students to participate in the experimentalist process described
further below. See James S. Liebman, Towards a New Scholarship For Equal Justice, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 273, 282-93 (2003).
58. Karkkainen, NEPA, supra note 49, at 907 n. 11 (discussing Posner, Daniel Farber, Margaret
Radin and Thomas Grey's recent work discussing Dewey and pragmatism).
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flows from Dewey's method and seeks to implement a dynamic,
experimentalist approach to public and sometimes private governance. Rather
than try to categorize Dewey's thinking, we instead begin with Dewey's own
assessment of modem governance and the experimentalist method that he
proposed.
As described in The Public and its Problems, Dewey's pragmatic view of
democracy is a worthy twentieth century heir of Madison's dialectical
federalism. The main difference between the two may be Dewey's more
developed view of the "factions" Madison placed at the core of his political
theory. Where Madison understood rational reflection on the objects of self-
interest as the motivator of substantial amounts of human action and
association-those motivated by "interest" as opposed to "opinion" 59-Dewey
felt that all political motivations are encrusted in habits arising from
associational customs. Agreeing with William James that habits are "the
enormous fly-wheel of society," Dewey believed that:
the idea that men are moved by an intelligent and calculated regard for their own
good is pure mythology. Even if the principles of self-love actuated behavior, it
would still be true that the objects in which men find their love manifested, the
objects they take as constituting their peculiar interests, are set by habits reflecting
social customs.
60
Dewey's view that individuals are inextricably defined by their
idiosyncratic associations and the sticky habits those associations create61 led
him to focus more attention than Madison on the difficulty of constructing (as
opposed to discovering) the common good. To be sure, Madison recognized
that, even with "the greatest technical skill" and "the fullest and most mature
deliberation," the common good is difficult to define "distinctly" and without
"obscurity." 62 For Madison, however, the main problem is "the imperfection of
human faculties" and the "cloudy medium" of language.63 Although briefly
acknowledging the role played by "the complexity of object[ive]s," Madison
mainly proceeded on the assumption that the "general good"-"the
comprehensive and permanent interest of the State"-is there to be discovered
as long as inquiry is scientific and untainted by the "prejudices, interests and
pursuits" of "ambitious ... parties, and sects."
64
For Dewey, in contrast, "[t]he prime difficulty.., is that of discovering the
means by which a scattered, mobile and manifold public may so recognize
59. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 5, at 78 (James Madison), and infra note 76.
60. DEWEY, supra note 53, at 159-60.
61. See, e.g., id. at 186 ("[I]ndividual and social are hopelessly ambiguous, and the ambiguity will
never cease as long as we think in terms of an antithesis.").
62. THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, supra note 5, at 229 (James Madison); see Madisonian Equal
Protection, supra note 1, at 936 n.493.
63. THE FEDERALIST, No. 27, at 229.
64. Id.; THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 5, at 296 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51,
supra note 5, at 325 (James Madison).
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itself as to define and express its interests." 65 The problem thus "lies deeper"
than the rule of decision (for example, one person one vote and majority rule).
"[I]t. is in the first instance an intellectual problem: The search for conditions
under which the Great Society"-the mass of individuals in a polity-"may
become the Great Community" through the formulation and expression of a
common interest.
66
Despite these differences, Dewey's and Madison's constitutional visions
are strikingly similar. Both understand the chief object of human society and
government to be "[liberty... that secure release and fulfillment of personal
potentialities." 67 Both define equality (what Madison called "justice") in the
economized manner demanded by that libertarian concern. In Dewey's words,
"[e]quality does not signify that kind of mathematical or physical equivalence
in virtue of which any one element may be substituted for another" but rather
the "effective regard for what is distinctive and unique in each, irrespective of
physical and psychological inequalities." 68 Equality thus "is not a natural
possession but is a fruit of the community when its action is directed by its
character as a community." 69 Dewey's belief that "community" is distinguished
from "society" by its members' recognition of their shared interests, and that
equality "is a fruit of the community"-if and when the community's "action is
directed by its character as a community"-also seem to track Madison's view
that fraternity or the minimum condition of social solidarity consists in the
shared acceptance of all members' equal capacity to pursue their own
distinctive and unique potentialities.7 '
Like Madison, Dewey believed that the great desideratum, liberty, is also
its own worst enemy. For Madison, the pursuit of liberty leads people to
threaten each other's exercise of that capacity, and worse yet, to band together
in factions to do so. When republican self-rule replaces other forms of
government, the problem grows because of the power of majority factions to
use self-government as a mechanism for "injustice" for majorities' ongoing
"oppression" of minorities.72 Characteristically, Dewey takes the point a step
65. DEWEY, supra note 53, at 146.
66. Id. at 146-47.
67. Id. at 150; see infra note 77; Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection II.B. I
(discussing Madison's similar views).
68. DEWEY, supra note 53, at 150-51.
69. Id. at 151; see Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection II.B.2 (discussing
Madison's similar views).
70. DEWEY, supra note 53, at 147.
71. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 5, at 78 (James Madison) ("The diversity in the
faculties of men from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a
uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government."); see also
EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 121 ("It would appear that the minimum requirement for a republic is that it
honor the great body of the people by respecting their capacity to choose."); Madisonian Equal
Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection II.B.1 (discussing Madison's similar views).
72. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section II.B. Dewey also makes Madison's
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further: Liberty is not simply facilitated by group action; it is group action. The
"secure release and fulfillment of personal potentialities" that constitute liberty
"take place only in rich and manifold association with each other."73 Yet, it is
exactly those associations, and the habits they generate, that over time enslave
individuals by preventing them from pursuing potentialities that have no use or
place within the group. They "'doom[] us all to fight out the battle of life upon
the lines of our nurture or our early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit
that disagrees, because there is no other for which we are fitted and it is too late
to begin again.'
74
As did Madison, Dewey often used associations defined by occupation as
illustrations, including of the entrapping quality of associational habit:
Habit does not preclude the use of thought, but it determines the channels within
which it operates. Thinking is secreted in the interstices of habits. The sailor, miner,
fisherman and farmer think, but their thoughts fall within the framework of
accustomed occupations and relationships. We dream beyond the limits of use and
wont, but only rarely does revery become a source of acts.... Thinking itself
becomes habitual along certain lines; a special occupation.
75
Also like Madison, Dewey recognized that the most powerful associations and
habits are ones built not on occupation but on belief or "opinion." 76
If anything, Dewey was more committed to majority rule than Madison. For
Dewey, democracy as a form of government is not just (as for Madison) the
fulfillment of the logic of liberty and self-government. 77 It also is the best
general method of discovering the common interest in any given situation.
Following De Tocqueville, Dewey believed that "popular government is
educative [of rulers], as other modes of political regulation are not."78 It "forces
a recognition that there are common interests, even though the recognition of
basic point in abbreviated fashion, stating "[Iliberty is then thought of as independence of social ties, and
ends in dissolution and anarchy." DEWEY, supra note 53, at 150.
73. DEWEY, supra note 53, at 150. Dewey here describes each of the basic ideas associated with
democracy as "shibboleths," and that "[flratemity, liberty and equality isolated from communal life are
hopeless abstractions. Their separate assertion leads to mushy sentimentalism or else to extravagant and
fanatical violence which in the end defeats its own aims." Id. at 149.
74. Id. at 159-60 (quoting William James); Dewey concluded that "[h]abit is the mainspring of
human action." Id.
75. DEWEY, supra note 53, at 160.
76. Id. at 162 ("Habits of opinion are the toughest of all habits .... ). Dewey discusses the power
of habit at greater length in Human Nature and Conduct, which begins by comparing habits to
"physiological functions, like breathing, digesting." JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT 14
(1922). For Madison's view, see supra note 59; Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section
IIB, and in particular on his concern for oppression based on differences in opinions at Subsection
II.B.2.a.
77. For Madison's view, see supra note 5, and Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at
Subsection II.B.I. Madison concluded that only republican government was "reconcilable ... with the
honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom to rest all our political experiments on
the capacity of mankind for self-government." THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 5, at 240 (James
Madison).
78. DEWEY, supra note 53, at 207.
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what they are is confused; '79 Moreover, "the need it enforces of discussion and
publicity brings about some clarification of what [the common interests]
are"-all forms of democracy "to some extent.., involve a consultation and
discussion which uncover social needs and troubles." 80 And democracy seeks
that information from the individuals most likely to have it. "The man who
wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and where it pinches, even if the
expert shoemaker is the best judge of how the trouble is to be remedied.",
8 1
Yet, Dewey was also at least as concerned as Madison about "the 'problem
of minorities'"'-that is, their oppression by "an oligarchy managed in the
interests" of less than the whole. 82 Dewey without naming Madison, compares
how among early American writers, "[f]actionalism was decried by all thinkers
as the chief enemy to political stability," and yet "[e]xtensive and consolidated
factions under the name of parties are now not only a matter of course, but
popular imagination can conceive of no other way by which officials may be
selected and governmental affairs carried on." 83 Dewey describes how
advances in industrial organization and technology of communication made
possible consolidation of political power far beyond the sort of factions that the
Framer's imagined, making factional control a permanent fact of political life.84
For Dewey the protection of minorities is a matter not simply of preserving
their liberty against the "repression of... potentialities." 85 It also is a matter of
informing the community about common problems and solutions. There thus
are two reasons why members of the minority must "have the chance to
inform" office-holders "as to their needs," why this "enlightenment must
proceed in ways which force the administrative specialists to take account of
their needs," and why minorities must rightly know "that next time [they] may
79. Id. at 207.
80. Id. at 207, 206.
81. Id. at 207. Dewey qualified that "[p]opular government has at least created public spirit even if
its success in informing that spirit has not been great." Id.
82. Id. at 208. Although in these passages, Dewey was most concerned about an oligarchy of
"experts," what he says about the problem of tyrannized minorities holds true whether their oppressors
are experts or majorities who habitually freeze them out of consideration.
83. Id. at 119. Dewey decries how "big business rules the governmental roost," and "bosses with
their political machines fill the void between government and the public," though even "parties are not
creators of policies to any large extent," but instead are largely ineffective except in retaining power, and
only "yield in piece-meal accommodation to social currents, irrespective of professed principles." Id. at
118-20.
84. Dewey notes that early critics of popular government "prophesied a flux of governmental
regimes, as individuals formed factions, seized power, and then lost it as some newly improvised faction
proved stronger." Id. at 116. This sort of flux, with no faction taking permanent control, is something
like what Madison hoped would occur. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection
tI.B.2. The cause of the transformation is that "elimination of distance, at the base of which are physical
agencies, has called into being the new forms of political association." DEWEY, supra note 53, at 114-
15.
85. Id. at 148. For Madison's views, see Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection
I.BI.
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be successful in becoming a majority. ' 86 First is Madison's reason. Only in
these ways can minorities' need for self-fulfillment be met, providing them
with a socially stabilizing "substitute for bullets." 87 But second, the interests of
minorities and their preferred means of obtaining them will often turn out to be
more socially useful and generalizable than other interests. Dewey thus
believed that "all valuable as well as new ideas begin with minorities, perhaps a
minority of one. The important consideration," therefore, "is that opportunity
be given that idea to spread and to become the possession of the multitude."88
Diversity becomes a critical component of the experimentalist method,
permitting different ideas to be tested and compared, and providing a creative
ferment out of which a better democracy can emerge.
For Dewey as for Madison, therefore, a "cure for the ailments of
democracy" 89 must permit two things to occur. It must preserve individuals'
freedom to govern themselves and the groups and the polity through which they
operate. But it also must free individuals from the parochialism and internecine
strife that factional allegiances invite-rendering possible a stable political
community defined and governed according to its common interest. 90 Both
theorists also believed that institutional structures had to be developed to wean
self-governing individuals of their disposition towards narrow-minded pursuit
of factional self-interest or habitual social customs and to enable them instead
to discern and pursue the objectives of the wider community.
Revealing that he had more in common with Dewey than at first appears,
Madison struggled to design "interior" arrangements or "situations" that made
"habitual" officials' consideration of the broadest possible range of interests in
addition to their own-that "incite[d] office-holders incidentally, but
86. DEWEY, supra note 53, at 208 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 207.
88. Id. at 208.
89. Id. at 146. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section V.A, 860 n.98, 886 n.222
(discussing Madison's similar formulation as to the "mortal diseases" of the Articles); see also James
Madison, The Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 1, at 353-57; Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1987), in
9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 318.
90. Although lacking in Madison's elegance in The Federalist Papers Nos. 10 and 51, Dewey's
version is substantively similar:
From the standpoint of the individual, [democracy] consists in having a responsible share
according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which one
belongs and in participating according to need in the values which the groups sustain. From
the standpoint of the groups, it demands liberation of the potentialities of members of a group
in harmony with the interests and goods which are common.... [T]his specification cannot be
fulfilled except when different groups interact flexibly and fully in connection with other
groups. [It cannot be fulfilled]... at the cost of [a group's] repression of [its members']
potentialities which can be realized only through membership in other groups ... [or by]
prevent[ing] the operation of all interests save those which circumscribe [the group] in its
separateness.
DEWEY, supra note 53, at 147-48; see Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Part III (discussing
Madison's similar views).
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voluntarily, to conform to the norms of their office." 9' And despite Madison's
more optimistic view of the accessibility of the common good, he anticipated
Dewey's recognition that achieving a "greater understanding of the public
interest" required national institutions to "draw[] on the diverse interest and
opinions of the people at large"-in the process harnessing "a wider knowledge
than would be available to government by the few" and converting
"diversity ... to unity."92 Revealing that Dewey was less of a Pavlovian than
his emphasis on habit might suggest, he sought governance arrangements that
enabled individuals to break the hold of pre-existing "habits" and "groups" and
discover interests held in common with others-arrangements that make
habitual an openness to new associations, opinions, and solutions to public
problems.
93
B. Dewey's Experimentalism
It is here that Deweyan experimentalism comes into play. Experimentalism
is the "method" Dewey proposed to enable the "scattered, mobile and manifold
public... [to] recognize itself' as a "great community" defined by common
interest.94 This transformation, he believed, could occur only in the actual day-
to-day process of self-government, which he equated with public problem-
solving-"uncover[ing] social needs and troubles" and "best judg[ing] how the
trouble is to be remedied." 95
By calling the method "experimental, not absolutistic," Dewey did not
mean "carrying out ... experimentation like that of laboratories," but instead
keeping premises and conclusions open and subject to constant testing and
revision.96 Dewey believed that thought is fundamentally practical. We resort to
instrumental thinking, and set our habits aside, when there is a problem that we
need to solve and our habits are no longer adequate for the task. Further,
whether we recognize it or not, all thought works a change in the conditions
under which we interact with our environment. Once we start to define a
problem, each effort will shed light not just on solutions, but on the problem
itself or on our presuppositions, opinions, and habits. Dewey believed that
91. BEER, supra note 12, at 284-85; THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 5, at 352. See DEWEY,
supra note 53, at 160 (noting that "all distinctively human action has to be learned, and the very heart
blood and sinews of learning is creation of habitudes").
92. BEER, supra note 12, at 252-53, 383, 381 (discussing Madison's "horizontal federalism").
93. DEWEY, supra note 53, at 147-48, 185-219.
94. Id. at 146; see id at 185 (arguing that "the outstanding problem of the Public is discovery and
identification of itself').
95. DEWEY, supra note 76, at 206-07; see DEWEY, supra note 53, at 151 ("Associated or joint
activity is a condition of the creation of a community."); id. at 188 (arguing that movement from mere
interaction to a "community" "demands... perception of the consequences ofajoint activity, and of the
distinctive share of each element in producing it"; this "perception creates a common interest," i.e.,
"concern on the part of each in the joint action and in the contribution of its members to it.").
96. DEWEY, supra note 53, at 202.
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proper inquiry remains open, by approaching a problem recognizing that we
may come across the unexpected. "[C]oncepts, general principles, [and]
theories" are not taken as established first principles, or obstacles to learning,
but instead are "shaped and tested as tools of inquiry." 97 In particular, as to the
political science of government and regulation, "policies and proposals for
social action [are] treated as working hypotheses, not as programs to be rigidly
adhered to and executed"; they are "entertained subject to constant and well-
equipped observation of the consequences they entail.., and subject to ready
and flexible revision in the light of observed consequences." 98 The object of the
governing "apparatus" is "no longer" understood to be the generation of correct
answers itself but instead the development of the "means of making discoveries
of phenomena having social import and understanding their meaning." 99 In the
process, pre-existing habits of belief about what is absolute and eternal give
way to the habit of jointly forming, testing and refining provisional judgments
about the best approach for the "special situation" at hand. Doing so helps clear
the underbrush of inflexibly held opinions that anchor the "tough[est]" factional
commitments and hamper the formulation of common interests:
Differences of opinion in the sense of differences of judgment as to the course
which it is best to follow, the policy which it is best to try out, will still exist. But
opinion in the sense of beliefs formed and held in the absence of evidence will be
reduced in quantity and importance. No longer will views generated in [response to]
special situations be frozen into absolute standards and masquerade as eternal
truths.
100
Dewey believed that government or regulation could proceed using this
experimentalist method, as discussed. Further, not only does the process define
the work of the governing apparatus, but the functions and make-up of the state
itself must be reevaluated using this process, so that they are "critically and
experimentally determined."''
Thus the state cannot remain static, but must evolve as the social conditions
that underlie it evolve. However, this evolution need not proceed blindly or
haphazardly or be constrained by opinion and habit, as in the past. Instead,
Dewey asks that we instead proceed experimentally, with solutions to our needs
in mind. Only by doing so can we realize our potential. In Cornel West's
words, "[flor pragmatists, the future has ethical significance because human
97. Id.
98. id. at 202-03.
99. Id. at 203 (emphasis added).
100. Id.; see id. at 193 (giving as an example the debate over whether market or plan is the best
way to organize human activity: "[T]he question of what transactions should be left as far as possible to
voluntary initiative and agreement and what should come under the regulation of the public is a question
of time, place and concrete conditions that can be known only by careful observation"). Or, as William
James put it, "'The true' . . . is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only
the expedient in the way of our behaving." WILLIAM JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH (Fredson Bowers
ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1975) (1907).
101. DEWEY, supra note 53, at 74.
Vol. 22:261, 2004
Experimentalist Equal Protection
will-human thought and action-can make a difference in relation to human
aims and purposes."'10 2 The focus, as always with Dewey, remains on the future
and on change.
0 3
VI. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY EXPERIMENTALISM
Although something of a turbo-charged Madisonian in his political theory,
Dewey was no match for Madison as a political scientist. Although an entire
chapter of The Public and its Problems is devoted to the "method" by which
the government should go about determining the common interest, Dewey
admitted that his "experimental" approach was "not, indeed,.., the method"
much less "practical procedure" but only "the intellectual antecedents of such a
method"; they reveal Dewey "groping" towards a useable form of "social
inquiry," not devising a real plan of government.
104
Dewey did, however, suggest hope for reinvigoration of our political
system, in terms suggesting Madisonian collaborative federalism. While "older
forms of territorial association do not satisfy present needs," "functional" or
"occupational" ties that "grow out of immediate intercourse and attachment"
might permit such "reconstruction of face-to-face communities."' 0 5 Dewey
described that "[w]hatever the future may have in store," the need is that "local
communal life [] be restored," providing new public space that will be "alive
and flexible as well as stable."' 0 6 Such local communities would engage each
other, enrich each other, and though "[t]erritorial states and political boundaries
will persist," "they will not be barriers which impoverish experience."10 7
Further, Dewey may be Madison's match as a constitutional prognosticator,
given how aptly Dewey's "experimental" "apparatus" describes a multitude of
novel governance arrangements that have recently been adopted in the United
States and elsewhere. Those arrangements pursue public objectives as diverse
as improving outcomes for poor and minority public school students,'0 8
preventing sexual harassment and other employment discrimination, 109
102. CORNEL WEST, KEEPING FAITH: PHILOSOPHY AND RACE IN AMERICA 111 (1994).
103. Or as Richard Rorty writes, with humorous approval, Dewey's pragmatism provides "a
rationale for nonideological, compromising, reformist muddling-through (what Dewey called
,experimentalism'). It claims that categorical distinctions of the sort philosophers typically invoke are
useful only so long as they facilitate conversations about what we should do next." RICHARD RORTY,
OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, TRUTH 211 (2001). For Dewey, while "muddle, compromise and blurry
syntheses" may be less attractive as political or philosophical ideology, they also permit social progress
and adaptation to new circumstances. Id.
104. Id. at 185-86, 203, 217.
105. Id. at 212-13.
106. Id. at 216.
107. Id. at216-17.
108. See Liebman & Sabel, NCLB, supra note 49; Note, After Sandoval, supra note 49.
109. See Sturm, supra note 49.
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reducing housing discrimination and providing shelter for homeless families,
1 10
upgrading conditions of confinement in prisons and mental institutions,"'
creating enforceable fair labor standards for overseas factories,1 12 creating
effective habitat conservation and watershed management, 1 3 regulating toxic
chemicals, 14 ensuring adequate representation of indigent criminal
defendants,115 pursuing community-based policing, 1 6 deterring racial profiling
and other law-enforcement abuses, 1 17  ensuring constrained sentencing
discretion,1 8 and decreasing drug addiction and drug-related crime. 
11 9
The gist of experimentalism, or public problem-solving, 120 is the definition
by the "center" of an important public problem and the center's setting of rough
improvement goals and incentives for improvement. For example, in the public
education context, a state department of education might identify an
achievement gap between white and black public school students' 21 and set as a
goal "reasonable" yearly progress towards ending the achievement gap in a
110. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 39, at 1047-52; Leslie Kaufman, New York Reaches Deal to
End 20-Year Legal Fight on Homeless, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2003, at Al (describing creation of
independent monitoring body to oversee provision of housing to homeless families as settlement to long-
running litigation by homeless families seeking a right to shelter).
111. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 39, at 1029-43; Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of
Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 644 (1993) ("document[ing] a shift from a test case to
an implementation model of advocacy" in the context of prison reform litigation and "urg[ing] the
development of effective remedial strategies as a method of linking litigation to a broader strategy").
112. See FUNG, ET AL., supra note 49.
113. See CHARLES F. SABEL ET AL., BEYOND BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM 3 (2000); Michael
Burger, A Watershed Moment: A New Environmental Movement Is Born, NEXT AM. CITY, Issue 4, 2004,
at 10.
114. See Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation, supra note 49.
115. See Kyung M. Lee, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders, Indigent
Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming fall 2004).
116. See Garrett, supra note 49; Livingston, supra note 49; see also, Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing
And Equal Protection, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 53 (2003) (discussing constitutional issues raised by
"problem-oriented policing").
117. See Garrett, supra note 49.
118. See Brian Goldberg et al., Proportionality Review (June 10, 2003) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author); James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment, 1963-2003 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
119. See Dorf& Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts, supra note 49. In regard to uses of these techniques
outside the United States, see, for example, Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Participation, Activism, and Politics:
The Porto Alegre Experiment, in ARCHON FUNG & ERIC OLIN WRIGHT, DEEPENING DEMOCRACY:
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 45 (2002); Cohen &
Sabel, supra note 49; T.M. Thomas Isaac & Patrick Heller, Democracy and Development: Decentralized
Planning in Kerala, in FUNG & WRIGHT, supra, at 77; Ann-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of
Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 347 (2001); and Stewart, supra note 49, at 455-58.
120. For other general descriptions, see Dorf& Sabel, Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 49,
at 267; Dorf & Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts, supra note 49, at 846-47 (describing initial benchmark
procedures for drug treatment courts and their elaboration over time to include refinements); Simon,
supra note 49; Sabel & Simon, supra note 39, at 1067-97; Sturm, supra note 49, at 462-63.
121. Statewide versions of the experimentalist regime described in the parenthetical examples in
this paragraph are in operation in Kentucky, North Carolina, and Texas. The federal No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6311-
15), puts in place some elements of an analogous national regime. See Liebman & Sabel, Public
Laboratory, supra note 39, at 223-300; see also infra Subsection VII.C. 1.
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decade. The department would measure such progress and provide for annual
publication of performance data enabling the public to compare progress for
black and white children at all socio-economically similar schools in the
jurisdiction. The center's actions bind local actors or governing bodies but
leaves them with the freedom and responsibility to adopt their own, more
specific improvement metrics and plans for achieving the centrally set goal. For
example, schools may use achievement tests or portfolios of performance
measures to quantify the gap and indicate improvement; changes in school
governance, intensified professional development, and curricular innovations
might be components of an improvement plan. Typically, local improvement
planning is done by teams of stakeholders with a variety of informational
perspectives but who are all committed to defining the target problem more
precisely, then solving it (for example, principal, teachers, parents, second
students, community activists, and business leaders).
Periodic monitoring, comparison, and publication of all localities' plans and
outcomes on their own and on common metrics enable the center and the public
to identify "benchmark" levels of performance for comparable localities-the
highest levels shown as of then to be within the grasp of comparable sites of
local activity-and "best" or (pieferably) "better" practices associated with
improved performance. Benchmarks and better practices change over time, as
new sites of experimentation produce still better results, which explains why
some observers call these standard-setting processes "rolling rules regimes. 122
Information about what works and doesn't work likewise enables the center to
raise, lower, or make more specific its initial goals, and to switch or supplement
its performance metrics. Localities that repeatedly fail to reach or make
progress towards those benchmarks become the focus of special attention from
the center. Typically, improvement planning is assisted by teams of trained
professionals from similar, but better performing sites. Localities that
chronically fail face sanctions (for example, "take over" or reorganization of
failing schools or districts).
Overall, the process is continuous, not fixed or start-and-stop.
Experimentation is continuous, because local entities continually respond to the
particular and current manifestations of the problem by planning,
implementing, evaluating, re-planning, re-implementing, and so on. The flow
of information to, and monitoring and benchmarking by, the center is
continuous, because each local entity's unprecedented success sets a new
standard for similar entities. The flow of information back to the localities and
among networks of them also is continuous, because benchmarks create new
demands on localities, and demand by them for information about the better
practices that set the standard elsewhere. Everything-goals, standards,
122. See Simon, supra note 49; Sabel & Simon supra note 39, at 1062.
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measures, plans, and policies-is under continuous revision at both the center
and local sites.
In the public education example sketched above, the center-locality
relationship is between state and municipal entities, both of which are public
administrative bodies. But experimentalist arrangements currently exist
between entities at any two or more of the national, state, regional, county,
neighborhood, and even household levels. In the public education context, for
123example, the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, coupled with state
accountability regimes, invite a cascading series of center-local relationships
between the federal and state departments of education, state departments of
education and school districts, regional groupings or ad hoc networks of school
districts and those districts, school districts and schools, schools and
classrooms, and in some places classrooms and individual students and their
parents. 
24
In other experimentalist regimes, the central function of defining the
problem and setting overarching goals is performed in part by Congress' 25 or
state legislatures, l 6 by the Supreme Court 127 or state high courts, 128 by
standards and monitoring structures created by lower federal or state court
consent decrees, 129 or by local "problem-solving" courts. 130 And local entities
may be state or local courts13 1 or even individual juries, 132 as well as a variety
of administrative agencies and officials. Both central monitors 133 and local
experimenters 134 may also be or include non-governmental actors or collections
of public and private actors. Any number of combinations of these various
center-locality relationships may arise, as, for example, in the problem-solving
court, indigent representation, and sentencing guidelines contexts, where
123. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6311-15).
124. See Liebman & Sabel, NCLB, supra note 49, at 1710-13. For example, teachers in schools and
classrooms in Texas observed by one of the authors develop individual improvement plans for each
child. See generally H. M. Levin & C. R. Benfield, Families as Contractual Partners in Education, 49
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1799 (2002).
125. See Garrett, supra note 49, at 92; Karkkainen, NEPA, supra note 49, at 904; SABEL ET AL.
supra note 113, at 4,7-8, 10, 17-20.
126. See Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 39, at 231-57.
127. See Dorf& Sabel, Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 49, at 388-404; Sturm, supra note
49, at 479-89. See generally Liebman, supra note 118.
128. See Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 39, at 231-57; Sabel & Simon, supra
note 39, at 1035-43.
129. See Garrett, supra note 49, at 92-98; Sabel & Simon, supra note 39, at 1043-47.
130. See Dorf & Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts, supra note 49, at 832; see also Judith Kaye,
Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 125 (2004).
131. See Kaye, supra note 130; Goldberg et al., supra note 118; Liebman, supra note 118, at 75-76.
132. See Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death, supra note 118, at 104-05.
133. See FUNG ET AL., supra note 49, at 28; Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 39, at
230, 234, 242, 245-46; Sturm, supra note 49, at 546-54.
134. See Dorf & Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts, supra note 49, at 831-39. See generally Lee, supra
note 115.
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federal or state administrative entities sometimes serve as standard setters and
monitors, and combinations of local courts and public and private professionals
do the experimenting.
135
A variety of arrangements may create incentives for local governmental
agencies and officials to take part in these problem-solving regimes. In some
cases, participation is mandated or induced by legislative or administrative
improvement mandates, 136 judicial decrees 37 or potential civil liability.13 8 In
other cases, participation is the voluntary price of public funding.'
39
Sometimes, participation is prompted by a desire to avoid risk or default
penalties-for example, in the habitat conservation context, the stark all-or-
nothing outcomes faced in litigation under the Endangered Species Act, 140 and
in the drug courts context, the risk of conviction and lengthy imprisonment.1
41
At other times, the "shaming" consequences of public reporting requirements
provide an inducement.
1 42
Once local entities undertake these monitored experiments, the range of
actors they permit or invite to participate in local improvement planning and
monitoring is determined by a variety of mechanisms. Most important is the
logic of the problem itself. When faced with the task of achieving
improvements at least equal to those achieved by similar experimenters, it is
important to involve all parties with knowledge of causes and consequences as
well as individuals thought to be skilled in solutions-in Dewey's phrase "[t]he
man who wears the [pinching] shoe" as well as "the expert shoemaker."' 43 If,
for example, the idea is to fit police priorities and practices to the needs of the
community, then not only the police and community leaders, but also the day-
to-day victims of crime and of abusive police practices should be present.
44
When instead the problem is diverting first-time-offending drug addicts from
prison to a productive life, the addicted offender, members of his family, and
potential service providers may be as crucial to the process as judge,
prosecutor, and defense lawyer.' 45 When the issue is how to substitute a
135. See Dorf & Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts, supra note 49, at 832-34; Goldberg et al., supra
note 118. See generally Lee, supra note 115.
136. See Goldberg, et al., supra note 118; Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 39, at
229-57, 278-823; Lee, supra note 115, at I 1-13; infra notes 169-171 and accompanying text (discussing
federal conditional pre-emption regimes).
137. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 39, at 1022-47.
138. See Garrett, supra note 49, at 77-81, 92-93; Sturm, supra note 49, at 479-89.
139. See Liebman & Sabel, NCLB, supra note 49, at 1721; Note, After Sandoval, supra note 49;
infra Subsection VIII.C. 1.
140. See generally SABEL ET AL., supra note 113.
141. See Doff& Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts, supra note 49, at 841-51.
142. See Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation, supra note 49, at 305-09.
143. DEWEY, supra note 53, at 207.
144. See Livingston, supra note 49, at 653-67; Garrett, supra note 49, at 107-41.
145. See Dorf& Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts, supra note 49, at 871-72.
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habitat-specific conservation plan for the local, state, and federal land-use and
environmental regulations and decrees that might otherwise govern, it is
important for officials from each of those levels of government, as well as the
various actual and would-be users of the land in question and environmental
activists, to take part.'
46
Central monitoring also plays a role in broadening participation. Monitors
provide a focal point for aggrieved stakeholders who were not allowed to
participate; the breadth and conditions of participation may themselves be a
subject of benchmarking and better practices; and improvement teams
organized by the center to review failing local entities may include, or locally
engage, a broad range of participants. Over time, the local improvement
planning process with the best informed collection of participants-which
ought to include the broadest range of actual stakeholders-should "win,"
setting the benchmark that all others, for the time being, must meet.
In addition, legislative, administrative, and judicial mandates may specify
stakeholders who must be able to participate in improvement planning.
147
Public reporting requirements may also give aggrieved and vocal consumers of
the information an entree. The latter may occur when local community groups
use public information as a basis for agitating for improvement--or for
working with insiders to investigate the problem, plan to improve it, and
monitor effects. 48 Outsiders also may gain entree when public information
triggers the filing of administrative or judicial enforcement actions and helps
the moving parties meet their burden of proof. 1
49
These various participants proceed to problem solve in a fluid manner that
preserves their diverse contributions. Consistent with Dewey's outline of the
preferred "experimental" process, "general principles" are not taken as eternal
truths but only as "tools of inquiry." True, the center begins by defining the
problem and setting rough performance goals and measures. It does so,
however, without any assumption that the definition, goals, and measures are
the right ones and with a willingness to revise them in the light of experience.
The center does not impose a single central solution but requires a host of local
experimenters to devise their own locally tailored answers, subject to
continuous local, central, and public monitoring for success, and to revisions
called for by comparing results. In good Deweyan fashion, ."policies and
146. See generally SABEL ET AL., supra note 113.
147. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 49, at 88-89 (describing legislation that defines stakeholders to
take part in evaluating traffic stop statistics).
148. See, e.g., Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Countervailing Power in Empowered,
Participatory Governance, in ARCHON FUNG & ERIC OLIN WRIGHT, DEEPENING DEMOCRACY:
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE (2002); Liebman & Sabel,
NCLB, supra note 49, at 1739-43 (giving an example of this process in the school context in Louisville,
Kentucky).
149. See, e.g., Liebman & Sabel, NCLB, supra note 49, at 1744-45.
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proposals for social action [are] ... not programs to be rigidly adhered to and
executed," and instead are "treated as working hypotheses.. .subject to
constant and well-equipped observation of the consequences they entail...
and... to ready and flexible revision in the light of observed consequences."
The center's product is not "itself knowledge"-the right solution for every
permutation of the problem-but instead the "means" of discovering answers in
particular situations and based on experience over time. Because participation
is organized around the common goal of resolving a roughly agreed upon
problem, and because of a commitment to data-driven analyses of success,
"[d]ifferences of opinion" will more often than before be "differences of
judgment as to the course which it is best to follow" or "the policy which it is
best to try out" and not differences of "beliefs formed and held" habitually in
common with one's associates and in the absence of evidence. Because a range
of experiments takes place, and likes are compared to likes, solutions
"generated in view of special situations" are not "frozen into absolute
standards."
150
VII. MADISON AS PROTO-EXPERIMENTALIST
Although John Dewey gave experimentalism its name and elaborated
"antecedents" of a "method" for achieving it, 151 James Madison had long since
designed a rudimentary constitutional method for achieving it and assigned it a
crucial constitutional purpose.' 52 The method is cooperative federalism. The
purpose is equal protection.
53
In its basic structure, Madison's interactive or dialectical federalism was
experimentalist.1 54 The national government would have responsibility for
150. The quotations in this paragraph are from Dewey, supra note 53, at 202-03, discussed supra
Section V.B.
151. DEWEY, supra note 53, at 185; see supra Sections V.A-B.
152. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section IV.C; supra Part II.
153. See id.
154. Dorf and Sabel suggest this possibility based on Madison's idea of dividing responsibilities
among competing agencies of government that are jealous of each other's powers. See Dorf & Sabel,
Drug Treatment Courts, supra note 49, at 876 (arguing that "the experimentalist form of accountability
could be considered neo-Madisonian because it harnesses competition among institutions to ensure that
they all act in the public interest... [by] play[ing] rival branches and levels of government against one
another .. "). But cf id. at 875 (arguing that in experimentalist regimes "accountability is not of the
Madisonian sort, in which power is divided among distinct representative units, and in which
deliberation-in the sense of disinterested preference-changing reflection-is the province of a
senatorial elite removed from ordinary politics"); Dorf & Sabel, Democratic Experimentalism, supra
note 49, at 267 (arguing that "a shift towards democratic experimentalism holds out the promise of
reducing the distance between, on the one hand, the Madisonian ideal of a limited government assured
by a complex division of powers and, on the other hand, the governmental reality characteristic of the
New Deal synthesis"). Here and in Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, we show that the
Madisonian ideal-as opposed to the Constitution actually adopted in 1789-is closer to democratic
experimentalism than Dorf and Sabel suggest, and that equal protection achieved through interactive
federalism is what fills the gap between the Madisonian ideal and the imperfect reality of 1789.
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more momentous problems calling for general solutions; state responsibilities
would be more numerous and mundane, their solutions more specific. 155 In the
few cases in which the national government acted, it would use state officials to
administer its solutions, with the dual goal of having local officials "embrace
[the national government's] more enlarged plan of policy than the existing
[state] government may have pursued," while providing "local information"
and the "assistance of state codes" to the national government. 156 In most
matters, initiative would come from the states, subject to review for "injustices"
by an organ of "the extended republic."' 157 The veto power through which that
review would take place was to be "the mildest expedient that could be devised
for preventing these mischiefs."'' 58 In lieu of the "coercion" of commanded
actions before the fact or punitive force against unjust acts after the fact,
Madison relied on continuous monitoring by broadly focused national officials
to instill local actors with habits of action that routinely "prevent attempts to
commit [the mischiefs].', 159 By monitoring, national officials would gain more
local information, including about state codes, which would influence exercise
of the veto, especially when state results were compared. The power to
formulate solutions to public problems would remain chiefly with each of the
States, and would be regulated as much by what the other states did and how
they succeeded as by the independent judgments of national officials.
Madison's proposed governance method was, to be sure, a rudimentary
version of the experimentalism Dewey later groped for and public regimes are
currently engaged in. True to Madison's eighteenth century vantage point, his
sense of the locus of the problem and solution was not on administration but on
legislation-prompting a veto that was legislative both in what was reviewed
and in who did the reviewing. Also, because it was a confederation of states the
Framers convened to fix, Madison's constitutionalism focused mainly on
relations between states and the nation. The relations Madison imagined were
also more "start and stop" than continuous. State legislation would await
congressional review before going into effect; federal legislation would be
infrequent and episodic; and state administration of federal initiatives would be
a local side-light, not an occupation.
Even in these respects, however, Madison anticipated the lines along which
a more sophisticated interactive federalism might develop. He recognized, for
155. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
156. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 5, at 297 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 56,
supra note 5, at 347-48 (James Madison); Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection
IV.C.4; supra note 17 and accompanying text.
157. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection IV.C.4; supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
158. James Madison's Speech at the Convention (June 8, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON,
supra note 1, at 41.
159. Id.; see Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section ILA; supra Part 11.
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example, that "counties and towns are to the [states]" what the states are to the
national government, inviting the same local injustices and warranting the same
structural solutions.' 60 At the Convention, objections to his legislative veto led
him to advocate quasi-administrative adjuncts: state and national "councils of
revision," which would engage executive officials and judges in reviewing
legislative experiments at the state level and monitoring the congressional
monitor at the national level.161 To reduce the impracticality of suspending state
laws until Congress passed on them, Madison proposed having state laws go
immediately into effect, pending national review.' 62 In doing so, he
acknowledged the potential role of intermediate monitors, proposing that "some
emanation of the [veto] power" be vested in some set of men within the several
states with an impartial perspective who could temporarily approve laws until
Congress finished its review.1 63 Importantly, this last adjustment invited
national monitoring based on the experience of state laws already in operation,
thus enriching the information pool based on which the veto and state-by-state
comparisons would take place. 64
Recent developments in federal administration illustrate the adaptability of
Madison's dialectical federalism to modem experimentalist regimes. As
Professor Beer has shown, there is a strong affinity between Madison's
interactive federalism-what Beer calls "horizontal federalism"-and "the
huge expansion of conditional grants in aid by the federal government," which
invite "state and local governments" to serve as "the administrative agents of a
vast array of national programs. ' 65 Although Beer's observations encompass a
variety of federal programs, including ones in which the "strings" tied to
federal money are essentially command-and-control cables and pulleys, the
Madisonian link is clearest in experimentalist "grant in aid" arrangements.' 6
6
Under these latter arrangements, the administration of albeit national programs
contemplates a more equal and collaborative partnership between the national
160. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 5, at 296 (James Madison).
161. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
162. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 28, at 168 (remarks of
James Madison) (Madison's notes, June 8, 1787).
163. See id.; 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 46, at 28 (Madison's
notes, July 17, 1787) (remarks of James Madison).
164. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection IV.C.4; supra notes 15-17 and
accompanying text.
165. BEER, supra note 12, at 252-53.
166. See Dorf& Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts, supra note 49, at 875-76:
An experimentalist Congress will decreasingly enact statutes containing all of the details about
implementation. Nor (per the post-New Deal pattern) will it declare policy and delegate to
administrative agencies the authority to write rules and bring enforcement actions that
ostensibly carry out that policy. Instead, the legislative function will increasingly consist in the
identification of a problem and simultaneous authorization of local experimentation on
condition that the experimentalist entities (state, local, or ad hoc assemblies of smaller or
larger groups) assure rights of democratic access to relevant participants, fully disclose their
methods and results, and submit to evaluations comparing performance across jurisdictions.
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government, which identifies the problem and generally describes the kind or
degree of solution desired, and local administrative officials and institutions,
which design solutions in the first instance. Via reporting and re-granting
requirements and the benchmarking they invite, experimentalist grant in aid
programs also take better advantage of "local information" and "codes" than do
command and control approaches. 1
67
Still more Madisonian and experimentalist is federal regulation through
conditional preemption, or what the Supreme Court itself has aptly dubbed
"cooperative federalism."' 68 Under this form of administration, Congress
imposes a default scheme of federal regulation but invites the states to opt out
of it if they adopt their own, experimental, regulatory regimes that meet general
federal minimum standards and are subject to approval mechanisms inviting
interstate comparison and benchmarking.1
69
The spending power is classically thought to apply when, compared to the
states, the federal government is the more fair or efficient revenue collector but
the less fair or efficient spender. 170 Conditional preemption similarly applies
when federal officials are better at identifying problems in need of national
solution, but the states are better at solving them. 171 Generalizing both
propositions, the classically experimentalist situation arises when the problem
at hand is of sufficient moment to warrant a national commitment and the
diversion of national resources to its solution, but when the problem cannot be
solved without the application of local knowledge to the problem's local
idiosyncrasies followed by the national dispersion to similar localities of the
comparatively best results. The resulting combination of, on the one hand,
"extended" national perspective in identifying the problem, in calling for local
167. See, e.g., The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001)
(discussed infra Subsection VII.C. 1).
168. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981).
169. In areas in which it has authority to preempt state regulation, Congress may instead, without
engaging in impermissible "commandeering," offer states the choice of adopting their own regulatory
scheme pursuant to federal standards or having their citizens subjected to preemptive federal regulation.
See Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758-59 (1982) (holding that the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 permissibly requires that states adhere to federal
standards in lieu of federal preemption); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 (describing the federal Surface Mining
Act as establishing a program of "cooperative federalism" that permits States to opt out of preemptive
federal regulation if they enact programs that conform to local needs while meeting federal minimum
standards); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-63 (1992) (citing Hodel and Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm "n approvingly in explaining that conditional preemption does not directly
compel states to enact federal mandates and thus does not violate the Tenth Amendment); Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992) (noting that the Clean Water Act "anticipates a partnership between
the States and the Federal Government, animated by a shared objective").
170. See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, 50 VAND.
L. REv. 1137, 1204-12 (1997).
171. See, e.g., id. at 1214; BEER, supra note 12, at 252-53; see also New York v. United States, 505
U.S. at 168 (noting that conditional preemption leaves states with the ability to set their own policy:
"[S]tate governments remain responsive to the local electorate's preferences; state officials remain
accountable to the people.").
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solutions, and in monitoring and dispersing better or "best" results, and, on the
other hand, local independence, ingenuity and information in devising solutions
is classically Madisonian.
VIII. EXPERIMENTALISM AS PRAGMATIC MADISONIAN EQUAL PROTECTION
A. Experimentalism as Madisonian Equal Protection
This Madisonian light on experimentalism reveals how modem
experimentalist regimes help solve the problem of equal protection-what
Dewey called "the 'problem of minorities' and Madison called "injustice."
Although many more levels and branches of government are involved than
Madison contemplated (not to mention private actors) the basic Madisonian
structure of local initiative in the shadow of the center's "enlarging" and
generalizing definition of problems and monitoring of local solutions is intact.
Local entities plan and implement indigenous solutions to problems
provisionally identified at a higher level, but with the awareness that their plans
and results will be reviewed by others. The monitors have the "extended," more
"impartial" perspective that comes from being responsible to, and for, a broader
range of citizens, and they extend their perspective further by surveying and
comparing a wide array of local solutions. Each locality plans and implements
its solution, and the center reviews all solutions, with an eye to what has been
done elsewhere.
Over time, local actors develop a disposition to include minorities among
those whose interests they consider. Even if minorities have little power to
command attention locally, they are likely to have a more respected place in the
central monitoring agency's more "extended" constituency. Because local
action will be taken with an eye toward the expected response of the central
monitors, and because participation levels may themselves be benchmarked,
the "happy effect" Madison predicted will occur: local action will be taken with
the monitor's eye towards the interests of otherwise neglected minorities.' 72 In
addition, local actors' incentive to adopt local solutions that stack up against
the best solutions achieved elsewhere give them a stake in obtaining the "new"
and "valuable" contributions that, as Dewey showed, minorities can often
make. 173 Experimentalism thus pushes beyond equal consideration toward
equal participation. Incentives to solve problems encompass incentives to make
participation in problem-solving as broad as the range of groups with a stake in
172. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 1, at 317, 318; Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16,
1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 382-84; see Madisonian Equal Protection,
supra note 1, at Subsection IV.C.4; supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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the problem's solution and thus with information about how to solve it. Where
collective action problems exist, it behooves the local experimenting agency to
find appropriate representatives for groups whose members know a lot about
the problem because they contribute to its cause or suffer its effects even if
individual members have little incentive to join in its solution.
Also Madisonian is the center's constant accessibility to "local
information" about what works and what does not, what is possible and what
has not yet been shown to be. Such information can help answer a difficult
standard-setting question that has long plagued judicial efforts to define and
implement equal protection: which constituency with more favorable outcomes
is the "similarly situated" one whose outcomes provide the standard against
which equality is fairly measured? Returning to the example of the
achievement gap in public education, it may not be possible or fair to require
every local school to enable its African-American students to perform
immediately at the level its white children do, much less at the level of the
average white pupil in the state or nation. But by comparing a school's progress
in closing the gap to the progress attained by myriad schools around the state or
nation-including many that, with little controversy, can be seen to be similar
to the school in question-it is possible to hold the school to a standard of
improvement that is demonstrably within its grasp. 174 This benchmarking
process can continue until the average of each population is equal to that of all
others both locally and nationally or until it is demonstrably shown that no
further progress is possible. But the impossibility of attaining those goals all at
once no longer provides an excuse for making no progress at all.
Finally, experimentalism mimics Madison's objective of developing local
allegiances to the center's "more enlarged plan of policy" by relying upon local
officials to administer the center's initiatives.1 75 Notwithstanding each
locality's autonomy over initial planning and implementation, the provisional
definition of the problem, the obligation to seek solutions of some sort, and a
general idea of the target level of improvement local sites are obliged to pursue
are all the product of a higher level of government with a "more enlarged"
outlook. The source of the general definition of the problem and solution in
representatives of a more extended constituency, the recognition that each local
entity's successes will contribute to the more extended jurisdiction's overall
solution and will be systematically shared with other local entities, the
availability to less successful local entity's of improvement teams organized by
the center and comprised of skilled practitioners from other local sites, and
local practitioners' contributions to the center's successful problem-solving as
174. See James S. Liebman, Towards a New Scholarship for Equal Justice, 30 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 273, 289 (2004).
175. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 5, at 297 (James Madison); see Madisonian Equal
Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection IV.C.4; supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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well as their own, all have a capacity to create "affections and consultations"
that transcend the parochial.1 76 Insofar as this broadened perspective is more
considerate of the interests and open to the participation of local minorities it,
too, contributes to Madisonian equal protection.
In sum, modem experimentalism's vibrant brand of Madisonian
cooperative federalism' 77 provides substantial protection to local minorities
afflicted by nationally defined problems who, under the yoke of factional
tyranny or neglect, lack the power to compel local solutions and participate in
formulating them. Experimentalist equal protection is undoubtedly quieter than
the "exterior" Fourteenth Amendment brand on which the nation has recently
relied, punctuated as it has been by high profile judicial decrees, protracted
litigation, affirmative remedial injunctions, massive and passive resistance,
heated debates about the meaning of rights, ferocious attacks on the legitimacy
of review and remedial engineering by unelected judges, and judicial
retrenchment and retreat.' 78 But like its "interior" Madisonian forerunner,
experimentalist equal protection has the potential to be more effective,
hardwired as it is into the continuous operation of local, state, and national
government.
B. Experimentalism as Pragmatic Madisonianism
Experimentalism is not only an updated version of Madisonian equal
protection, but also a more pragmatic version in both senses of the word.
Above, we show that experimentalism A la Dewey is even more philosophically
committed than Madisonian dialectical federalism to philosophical pragmatism:
to learning by doing and to the provisionality of knowledge and beliefs.1 79 Here
we show that modem experimentalism is more practical than Madison's
national negative in that it is more efficient and more easily administered. It
penetrates far deeper into the interstices of government where discrimination
can take place, while intruding less on state and local prerogatives.' 80
1. Broader Equal Protection
As we note earlier, Madison's effort to reach the "infinitude of...
expedients,"' 81 by which local majorities may oppress minorities through a
176. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 5, at 296 (James Madison).
177. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection IV.C.4; supra notes 15-17 and
accompanying text.
178. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section V.B; supra Part 11.
179. See supra Section IV.B.
180. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Part VII (discussing the national negative's
impracticality and intrusions upon state sovereignty); supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (same).
181. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 1, at 212.
Yale Law & Policy Review
congressional veto power in "all cases whatsoever on legislative acts of the
States" was both wildly under-inclusive, given the many state and local
tyrannies that occur under executive and administrative authority, and wildly
over-inclusive, given the many local legislative actions that pose little threat of
injustice.182 Modem experimentalism avoids both problems.
To begin with, unlike Madison's legislative veto, 183  modem
experimentalism reaches municipal and administrative as well as state and
legislative injustices. Indeed, unlike contemporary doctrine under the judicially
enforced Equal Protection Clause, t84 experimentalism even reaches injustices
by street-level bureaucrats that lack the imprimatur of state law or policy.
Moreover, experimentalism relies less than Madison's national negative on
heroic assumptions about Congress's insulation from factional influence
emanating from the states, its own constituencies, or the national political
parties (for which Madison never accounted, but which he feared would emerge
and whose formation he hoped his national negative and Council of Revision
would prevent). 185 This advantage is due partly to experimentalism's preference
for more "expert" and "neutral" administrative, judicial or even private
monitors over legislative ones. t 86 More importantly, experimentalism is less
susceptible to factional capture because of the greater objectivity of the data-
driven, inter-local comparisons on which the center's monitoring is typically
based. Because these comparisons are usually public and based on transparent,
quantifiable criteria, the outcome of the center's review is more akin to
recognizing the winner of a basketball game based on the final score than of
intuiting the winner of a congressional beauty contest. As Dewey complained,
"There is no particular public concerned in finding expert school instructors,
competent doctors, or business managers."' 87 Experimentalist remedies set out
to create a public concerned with such problems. Also important is the fact that
scores are never final. In contrast to the up-or-down, once-for-all-time nature of
the Madisonian veto, the provisional character of the experimentalist monitor's
benchmarking judgments subject to additional, continuously flowing
information may further reduce the attractiveness and effectiveness of factional
182. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 1, at 383.
183. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section V.C; supra Part 11.
184. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section V.B; supra Part II.
185. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section VII.C (noting that from the
standpoint of the equal protection concerns motivating Madison at the Convention, any "generalizing"
effect the two political parties have achieved at the national level has been more than offset by their
fortification and perpetuation of factional control at the state level). Dewey also criticizes the effect of
the party system, which he writes gives the public no choices, stating that parties are ineffective; "parties
are not creators of policies to any large extent," and "[p]olitical parties may rule, but they do not govern.
The public is so confused and eclipsed that it cannot even use the organs through which it is supposed to
mediate political action and polity." DEWEY, supra note 53, at 120-21.
186. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
187. DEWEY, supra note 53, at 123.
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capture. Thus, less is at stake in each one of a protracted series of reviews in
which relative positions are constantly changing.
2. Less Intrusive Equal Protection
These same characteristics help modem experimentalism minimize the
threat to local prerogatives and associated impracticalities that led the
Convention to reject Madison's congressional veto.188 Chief among those risks
and impracticalities was the uncertainty of the standards Congress would use in
deciding whether a state law passed national muster. Although the track record
of legislation adopted in sister states would have provided some assurances (at
risk of inefficient copy-catting and path dependency), first movers would have
no such assurances, and later movers would have remained at the mercy of
congressional changes of heart and turnovers in party control.
Experimentalism's dependence on "Can you top this?" inter-local comparisons
and benchmarking based on relatively objective criteria provides more
protection for early movers, who are held harmless at least until the next round
of reporting, and more certainty for later movers based on where they stand vis-
A-vis sister localities.
Under experimentalist regimes, local entities' substantial freedom to adopt
their own goals, plans and performance metrics-or, at least, to offer theirs as
alternatives to default standards imposed by the center-is enhanced compared
to Madison's veto by the central monitor's committed agnosticism among local
choices apart from the results they produce. As a result, local entities are more
clearly responsible for failing to meet their own standards than under both the
Madisonian precursor (where opaque, inconstant, and ill-informed
congressional preferences among goals, plans, and metrics might be blamed for
the rejection of local initiatives) or under post-New Deal command-and-control
regimes (where local failures can often rightly be attributed to inflexible supra-
local standards imposed without sensitivity to differences in how problems
manifest themselves locally).
In addition, the typical experimentalist remedy is not a "veto" of a locality's
proposal based on fuzzy predictions about its probable consequences, or even
rejection of the locality's plan after experience has shown it to be a failure.
Rather, the remedy is to let the locality decide how to meet the applicable
benchmark, including by standing pat with its existing plan, improving the
plan's implementation, or revising or replacing it. Even that remedy is not
ordered unless the center can back it up with information about demonstrably
effective better practices and by dispatching an improvement-assistance team
of skilled practitioners with a track record history of success elsewhere.
188. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection IV.C.5; supra notes 24-28 and
accompanying text.
Yale Law & Policy Review
Chronic failure may result in more drastic remedies, but only based upon the
locality's proven incapacity to meet attainable benchmarks after multiple tries.
Finally and most obviously, experimentalism tracks Madisonian interactive
federalism without putting states at the mercy of what even Madison believed
was the nation's most dangerous branch 19 and without violating the Supreme
Court's new limitations on state "commandeering." '1 90 Most of the central-local
relationships on which modem experimentalism relies do not put Congress (or
even federal administrative agencies) over state legislatures (or even state-level
administrative agencies). 191 Moreover, the "grant in aid" and "conditional
preemption" arrangements that typically are used when experimentalism does
create federal-state relationships are constitutional and relatively non-intrusive
because they involve voluntary state participation in federal programs or
regulation in return for federal funds or exemption from preemptive federal
regulation.1 92 Moreover, state autonomy, initiative and equal partnership with
the federal government is real, not a fiction, under experimentalist as opposed
to command-and-control versions of these arrangements because state and local
entities design, as well as implement, policy.
193
Overall, experimentalist regimes capitalize on the strengths of different
branches and levels of government while avoiding the institutional conflict that
Madison's colleagues feared the veto would create-and that post-New Deal
regulatory systems have often created. Through these regimes, Congress and
other central agencies avoid engaging in complex, prescriptive rulemaking
beyond their expertise. Instead, they at most define the public problem,
establish a general framework for measuring progress toward a solution, and
either themselves provide, or create intermediate administrative centers to
provide, an infrastructure for generalizing successful local initiatives, holding
poor performers to account, and periodically redefining the general rules. Nor
is authority to impose prescriptive substantive rules delegated to administrators
who are likewise distant from the people and their problems and subject to
factional capture. Nor, finally, are courts put in the untenable position of
second-guessing expert administrative judgments and imposing their own
vision of a correct, national solution.' 94 Instead, local bodies generate local, and
contribute to supra-local, standards as part of a process of experimentation,
189. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 50, supra note 5, at 316; Madisonian Equal Protection, supra
note 1, at Subsection V.B.2.
190. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Part VI; supra note 32 and accompanying
text.
191. See supra notes 175-178 and accompanying text.
192. Supreme Court decisions recognizing the constitutionality of both types of state involvement
in the administration of federal programs are cited supra notes 169-171.
193. See supra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
194. See Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 39, at 192-95. For discussion of the
important roles for courts in experimentalist regimes, see id. at 278-322. Sturm, supra note 49, at 537-
42; infra notes 239-246, 253-258 and accompanying text. See generally Sabel & Simon, supra note 39.
Vol. 22:261, 2004
Experimentalist Equal Protection
benchmarking, and exchanges of better practices. As definers of problems and
monitors of solutions, supra-local entities do what Madison recognized they do
best: bringing a more "extended," more "impartial" perspective to bear on all
stages of the process, triggering "a more enlarged plan of policy than" by itself
the local "government may have pursued."'195
3. More Fraternal Equal Protection
Experimentalism improves on Madisonian equal protection in one other
respect. Consistently with its Deweyan strain, experimentalism has a more
sophisticated understanding of the joint activity needed to define the common
good and thus a more fully developed concept of "fraternity."'
' 96
Madison and Dewey both juxtaposed political activity that, on the one
hand, pursues factional or habitual interests driven by unchosen family,
religious, racial and class associations and the "opinions" and occupations that
go with them, to governance that, on the other hand, is less partial, more
general and pursues the common good. 197 Both also believed that "diversity"
was largely responsible for the problem of faction and habit but also was
crucial to the process of steering political action in the latter, ameliorative
direction.198 As we develop elsewhere, however, Madison had a somewhat
more sanguine view of this process than Dewey.' 
99
For Madison, it was enough for "the extended republic" to make national
legislators beholden to a "society [with] so many separate descriptions of
citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very
improbable, if not impracticable." 200 Merely facing such a large and unruly
throng of interests and opinions would force national legislators to consider all
interests impartially in choosing actions consistent with the public good. Local
legislators would in time adopt the same stance, because they knew that,
without it, their acts and codes would be less likely to pass congressional
201muster. Madison assumed that freeing legislators from the politicallyirresistible distractions posed by the demands of stable majority factions would
195. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 5, at 83 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 46,
supra note 5, at 297 (James Madison).
196. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection II.B.3 (describing Madison's
economized conception of fraternity). In Madison's view, individuals are not required to fraternize at all,
unless they choose to have public as well as private lives, in which case they are required to practice the
similarly economized other-considering "virtue" described supra notes 9-12.
197. See supra notes 9-12, 64-66 and accompanying text.
198. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 5, at 78 (James Madison); see Madisonian Equal
Protection, supra note 1, at Section IIB; supra notes 73-74, 78 and accompanying text.
199. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section IB; supra notes 77-79 and
accompanying text.
200. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 5, at 324 (James Madison).
201. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text; Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at
Section III.A.
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itself enable them to abstract from parochial interests and see on the horizon the
"comprehensive and permanent interest" of the public that was visible to
anyone who took a broader view.20 2
Madison's sanguine view of how the general good comes to be recognized
left him with a thin notion of public participation and fraternity among
.. .. _ 203
members of the political community. Over time, national and state legislators
might develop a broader perspective and an eye for the general good, as might
state executive and administrative officials whose role in implementing federal
initiatives would make the broader interests of the nation "the objects of their
affections and consultations. '"20 4 But the connection of the public itself to the
framing of the public good was more attenuated. For most people, the shared
sense of a common good that underlies fraternity arises only from a common
recognition-which occurs only occasionally, in individuals' better
moments-of their equal status as choosers of values and plans and their equal
205interest in a system of government that respects that status. In other respects,
fraternity was negative. As long as the government did not play favorites, or
chronically elevate the interests of one faction over others, there was a
reasonable chance that violence would be avoided and a degree of social peace
and stability achieved.20 6
Dewey was less sanguine about the ease of identifying the common good,
202. Madison wrote:
Everyone knows that a great proportion of the errors committed by the State legislatures
proceeds from the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent
interest of the state to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which
they reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the collective
welfare of their particular State, how can it be imagined that they will make the aggregate
prosperity of the Union... the objects of their affections and consultations?
THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 5, at 296; see Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at
Section II.B. An opposing view of Madison is that he defines the common good as the results achieved
by any ad hoc coalition of interests that legislators happen to cobble together to form a majority on a
given occasion, as long as they treat each individual's interest and support as the equal of those of any
other individual, and thus are not captured by a single individual or group. See Cass Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31-35 (1985) (contrasting this interpretation of
Madison, associated with "interest-group pluralism," and a view of Madison as contemplating
"virtuous" legislators acting according to an independent concept of the public good); see also H.
Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1328, 1339 (1994) (criticizing Madison for being in the "public good" not the "interest group"
camp). We too reject interest-group pluralism as a description of Madisonian political theory and of the
construction of the public good in modem experimentalist regimes. We note, however, that
experimentalism, like interest-group pluralism, treats the common good as a distillate of the variety of
interests held by members of the public. Under experimentalism, however, the extent of the refinement
of interests and the range of additional considerations that are added to the mix are greater than under
the standard view of interest-group pluralism.
203. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsections II.B.3-4.
204. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 5, at 296 (James Madison).
205. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection II.B.4; supra notes 9-11 and
accompanying text.
206. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsections II.B.3-4; supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
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even after attention is diverted from parochial concerns. For Dewey,
"discovering the means by which a scattered, mobile and manifold public may
so recognize itself as to define and express its [common] interests" is "[t]he
prime difficulty" for democracy because it is only through "associated or joint
activity" in which the definition and expression of common interests actually
occurs that the grip of association and habit can be broken.20 7 It is only through
active participation in solving everyday public problems that a "society" may
be transformed into a democratic "community":
Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by
all singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such
as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it in being just because it is a
good shared by all, there is so far a community. The clear consciousness of a
communal life, in all its implications, constitutes the idea of a democracy.208
The core experimentalist activities require just the kind of joint activity that
Dewey had in mind: continuous planning, implementing, evaluating, and re-
planning of solutions at the local level, in inter-local networks, in exchanges of
information between localities and the center, and in the former's responses to
benchmarks the latter sets and improvement teams the latter organizes. Of
course, as we have noted, Dewey did not follow-up his discussion of the
"specifications" that had to be met if "the Community [was to] be organized as
a democratically effective Public" by actually devising a method of structuring
governance to realize those specifications. 2° 9 For that, we had to turn to
Madison's interactive federalism. 2 10 But once modern experimentalism puts in
place the Madisonian structure of local innovation and central monitoring, the
problem-solving communities it induces provide a richer version of fraternal
interaction and commitment to commonly devised solutions than Madison
hoped for. At least under modem conditions, that is, the breadth of the local,
local-center, and inter-local interactions needed to solve national problems
"attachles] ... to national objects," and mobilizes "the affections and
consultations" of a wider constellation of public and private actors-leading
them to "embrace a more enlarged plan of policy"-"than the existing
government would have pursued" and, indeed, than Madison himself
imagined.2 11
Experimentalism not only increases public participation but also thickens
institutional interaction. Expanding upon Madison's "horizontal federalism,"
207. DEWEY, supra note 53, at 146, 151.
208. Id. at 149.
209. Id. at 147, 149, 151. For Dewey's view that, to be successful, these associations had to be
"contaminated by contact with use and service"-i.e with real problems in their actual settings-see id.
at 175.
210. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection IV.C.4; supra notes 15-17 and
accompanying text.
211. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 5, at 440-41.
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under which States learn from each other,212 experimentalist regimes make
readily available for emulation not only the higher-level monitor's expanded
perspective, but also the decisional and substantive "better practices" of myriad
other problem-solving communities facing the same problems under similar
conditions.
C. Two Examples of Pragmatic Madisonian Equal Protection in Action
Brief sketches of experimentalism's operation in two contexts illustrate its
capacity to achieve Madisonian equal protection through Deweyan problem-
solving communities. We begin by fleshing out the public school example
alluded to above. We then give a second example from the employment
discrimination context.
1. Reforming Public Schools
In response to concerns that a deteriorating public school system was
placing the nation at risk, states in the 1980s began holding pupils to "minimum
standards" as measured by results on standardized tests. 2 13 By the mid-1990s,
the prevailing, crudely Darwinian use of test results to drive "high stakes"
penalties for failing students gave way, in some places, to diagnostic uses. In
these new regimes, test results, often supplemented by other performance
measures, are used to identify schools and districts, as well as children, in need
of improvement and curricula and other educational interventions that are
associated with success in particular contexts.
214
Legislatures and courts in Kentucky, North Carolina, and Texas, for
example, have responded to demands for a more equitable distribution of
educational funds and adequate educational outcomes across school districts,
and for greater accountability in the use of education funds, by setting general
performance goals 215 and requiring state education departments, districts and
schools to adopt plans for amplifying and achieving the goals and to report
progress toward doing so. 216 State educational administrators have used the
general goals as guides in the development of statewide curricula and tests
aligned with the curricula. Typically, these curricula and metrics are defined
not by information to be learned in particular grades, or teaching methods to be
212. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection IV.C.4; supra notes 15-17 and
accompanying text.
213. See Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 39, at 207-12.
214. See id. at 39-41.
215. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (setting
general goals, for example, that each pupil be given "sufficient oral and written communication skills to
enable students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization"); see Liebman & Sabel,
Public Laboratory, supra note 39, at 231-57.
216. See Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 39, at 206-07, 242-43.
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used there, but by operations students are expected to master by the end of a
particular grade-for example, "a capacity to use context to facilitate reading
comprehension." 2 17 State laws or regulations define levels of success on the
tests, ranging above and below some marker of proficiency, and oblige all
schools over time to reach proficiency, not only on average for the school as a
whole but for each identifiable student population at the school, such as
African-American, Latino, low-income and limited English proficiency
pupils. 218 Schools are ranked not just on annual test scores and measures such
as drop-out and attendance rates, but also based on rates of improvement on
those measures.
2 19
Typically, both proficiency levels and adequate improvement rates are
based on comparisons with similar schools rather than a statewide norm. In
Texas, for example, proficiency assessments are based on a comparison of
outcomes at each school to those achieved at the thirty-nine other schools in the
state with student bodies that are demographically and economically most like
its own.220 In North Carolina, improvement targets are set using a multiple
regression analysis that accounts for socio-economic status and other student
body demographics which affect predicted educational progress.221 In
Kentucky, part of the evaluation is based on progress toward closing
222achievement gaps between white male and other students. Schools that fail to
reach proficiency or to make adequate annual progress toward it after some
specified number of years are required to engage in improvement planning.
This requires that they identify improvement goals and programs to be
implemented to achieve the goals, often with the assistance of teams of
professionals from other schools and districts in the state who are trained in
peer review and informed about better practices that have succeeded elsewhere
under similar circumstances. 223 Schools with unacceptably low ratings over
multiple years face sanctions such as reorganization or state take-over. 224
State and (in some places) district-level educational administrators collect
and publish information about school and district outcomes on accessible
websites, organize improvement planning processes for failing schools,
distribute monetary and other rewards for steadily improving districts, and
217. See id. at 60.
218. See id. at 70.
219. The Texas Education Agency compiles information about performance on each of these
metrics at the school, district and statewide level and reports these results to the public on its website.
See id. at 70-71. Similarly, in Kentucky, schools are required to improve at a given rate. See id. at 94.
220. See id. at 241.
221. See id. at 231 n.214.
222. See id. at 98-99.
223. See id. at 72.
224. See id. at 68, 73.
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revise improvement targets and tests based on local experience. 225 A variety of
226private actors, some proceeding ad hoc, others establishing highly
sophisticated statewide nongovernmental organizations, 227 have used the data
being generated at both the state and local levels to make comparisons with
other like schools and districts, highlight deficiencies, demand improvements,
identify best practices, provide technical assistance, convene networks of
reforming schools, and the like. As much through these private actors as
through public ones, a substantial amount of benchmarking, information
sharing, and identification of "better practices" occurs.
2 28
Partly in order to improve success on state tests and partly in response to
demands by teaching professionals for a more meaningful say in their schools,
a parallel but bottom-up process has taken place at the classroom and school
levels. In some places, it has explicitly linked up with statewide accountability
regimes. 229 Groups of teachers and principals devise plans for improving their
students' mastery of important skills-say, reading comprehension for fourth
grade students-by specifying in some measurable way the results they hope
their pupils will achieve; collaboratively designing a plan for achieving the
goal; implementing the plans in the multiple classrooms or schools
representative in the collaborative; periodically comparing results across sites
based upon "inter-visitation" and observation of each other's implementation of
the plan in different settings; revise the initial plan and measures of success, or
the plan's implementation at particular sites, based on what did or did not work
in different settings; implementing and observing the results of the revised
plan; and so on. These processes are facilitated by extensive, ongoing
professional development activities built into the daily curriculum,
opportunities for less skilled teachers to visit classrooms of master teachers for
weeks at a time, periodic site visits by principals and district personnel, and
other forms of continuous information-sharing, monitoring and peer
evaluation.23 °
Recent federal legislation has the potential to extend these improvement
regimes to the national level. Inspired by reforms in Texas, the No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) 231 requires states seeking federal education funds
to submit plans to the federal Department of Education that identify the
"challenging academic content standards" and "student academic achievement
225. See id. at 71, 86.
226. See id. at 102.
227. See id. at 73-76.
228. See id. at 242-46.
229. See id. at 246-50.
230. See id. at 47-48. In Kentucky, state legislation requires the collaborative setting of school
policy by local councils composed of principals, parents, and teachers that formulate local policy in
meetings open to the public. See id. at 90-91.
231. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
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standards" that each state has chosen to use to define an adequate education for
all students in the state, annual tests in literacy and mathematics that are aligned
with those standards, and performance targets on the tests that apply not only to
schools as a whole, but also to each racially, economically, and educationally
defined sub-populations within the school.232 States then must report test results
and other outcomes to the public in an accessible comparative form, again by
school as a whole and by each sub-population within the school.
233
Under the NCLB, each state sets its own goals for "annual yearly progress"
(AYP), subject to the requirement that all plans call for all sub-populations to
234
meet the state standard of adequacy within twelve years. States must provide
technical assistance premised "on scientifically based research" to schools that
persistently fail to meet their AYP goals, in part through state-organized peer
support teams of master teachers. Students attending failing schools must be
provided with funds for supplementary education, and be permitted to transfer
to other public schools in the same district with transportation funded by the
235state. States also must reward schools (typically with monetary grants) that
"significantly close[ ] the achievement gap" between students from different
ethnic groups.236 Public criticism of the NCLB by states, teachers unions, and
local and national politicans may be justified as to its implementation thus far,
where states may lack adequate federal funding to comply with the NCLB's
requirements and adequate Department of Education regulations to provide
237guidance (though implementation remains in its preliminary stages). The
criticism we strongly disagree with, based on the discussion above, is that the
NCLB unduly emphasizes rote testing and intrudes on state prerogatives. That
criticism misunderstands the experimentalist nature of the remedy-the NCLB
rejects inflexible testing goals imposed from above and instead asks that states
set their own achievement and progress goals and standards. Those self-set
goals may be quite demanding, and states certainly should receive the funding
and guidance needed to comply, but the underlying program remains a valuable
232. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1111(b)(l), 1l11(b)(3), 1113-1115. Compliance is tied to receipt of federal
funds under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
233. Id. § § I1 Il I(b)(2)(C)(v), I1111 (b)(2)(G)(iii), I1 Il I(b)(2)(1), I1 Il I(b)(1 0), 11 16(a)(1)(c).
234. Id. §§ I 111(b)(2)(B)-(G), 111 l(b)(2)(I).
235. Id. §§ 11 16(b)(5), 1116(e), §§ 11 16(b)(1)(E), 11 16(b)(9), 1116(b)(10).
236. Id. §§ 1111(c)(3), 1111(c)(4), 1116(b)(4), 1117.
237. For a detailed response to various criticisms of the NCLB, see Liebman & Sabel, Public
Laboratory, supra note 39, at 286-300. The criticisms receiving the most coverage in the press are
related to funding, regulatory guidance, and federalism. Regarding funding, the allotment for the NCLB
is currently six billion dollars short of Congress's original authorization, leading some to contend that
the "amount states are getting is certainly not adequate to meet the tough standards in the law." See
Editorial, Rescuing Education Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2004, at A22. Furthermore, in regard to
regulatory guidance, the Department of Education has thus far been "slow in adopting regulations on
how the states can comply with the law." Id. Regarding federalism criticism by states, see Sam Dillion,
Bush Education Officials Find New Law a Tough Sell to States, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2004, at Al
(describing "discontent nationwide among educators and local politicians"). See also Sam Dillon, Utah
House Rebukes Bush With Its Vote on School Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2004, at A16.
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reform that could, at minimum, provide the catalyst for the kind of sustained
change involving participation of several sets of actors that occurred in Texas
and Kentucky.238
Further, although courts are no longer the sole engine of reform in
experimentalist remedies, they remain involved in two important ways. First, in
states like Kentucky and Texas, courts triggered the adoption of these
accountability schemes by ordering state legislatures to fix disparities in school
funding and outcomes. 239 In Kentucky, the state supreme court took the initial
step in building the experimentalist regime by setting general goals and
standards and ordering the state to devise a method for reaching them.240 In
Texas, after repeatedly failing to generate enough funds and redistribution
among school districts to satisfy state supreme court decrees in a funding-
equity suit, the state legislature finally agreed to provide more of both in return
for an experimentalist accountability system. 241 In both states, the courts'
and/or legislatures' confidence to act was increased by the work of broadly
representative groups of educational, community, and business leaders that had
previously convened over a number of years and developed accountability
proposals along the experimentalist lines that courts and legislatures later put in
place. 2
42
Second, once these schemes are in operation, and this includes the
NCLB,243 courts may be available as back-up monitors. Schools that fail to
pool information, adopt best practices, or perform adequately-or school
districts and states that permit them to do so without taking action-may be
subject to judicial decrees holding officials accountable for achieving at least
the level of results that comparable schools elsewhere in the state have
achieved.244
The Deweyan traits of these educational accountability regimes are easy to
spot. Preclusive first principles-for example, that racially balanced classrooms
are required or are anathema; that more money or a clearer incentive structure
is the solution; that phonics or whole-language is the best way to teach children
238. For a detailed discussion of how the NCLB can create a framework for reform that courts,
legislators, educators, advocacy groups, and civil rights groups might be able to tap into, see Liebman &
Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 39, at 291-96. See also Editorial, Rescuing Education Reform,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2004, at A22 ("The new law will need tinkering here and there. But its goal and its
general road map for getting there are the right ones. For the effort to truly equalize education to
succeed, Congress will need to fight off destructive schemes by lobbyists and bureaucrats of both parties
who are working hard to undermine the new initiative and to preserve the bad old status quo.").
239. See Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 39, at 234, 251.
240. Seeid. at 251.
241. See id at 236.
242. See id at 231-57.
243. See id. at 297-300.
244. For a proposal for court monitoring of this sort, see Liebman & Sabel, NCLB, supra note 49,
at 1743-48.
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to read-are suspended while collaborative problem-solving takes place under
discipline imposed by continuous monitoring and public reporting of success or
failure in improving outcomes. 245 Solutions and measures of success and failure
are provisional, "experimental," and validated or not by experience. Public
opinion about how to improve education in the "special situations" in which
every classroom, school, district, and state finds itself is generated jointly and
publicly at each of those levels, and is based on "evidence," not "beliefs" that
developed habitually from static associations and "masquerade as eternal" and
"absolute.,"
2 46
The reform process, and the equal protection it affords, is also recognizably
Madisonian. Local classrooms, schools, districts, and states innovate under the
eye of monitors at higher levels all the way up to the federal Department of
Education. In doing so, the local actors commit themselves to the goals the
higher level identified when establishing the regime and implement the higher
level's initiative. In doing so, however, the local actors retain maximal freedom
to innovate and continuously provide the higher level with useful "local
information" and "the assistance of [local] codes."247
More importantly, local problem-solvers have strong incentives to attend to
the interests of local minorities, and there is reason to expect that such attention
will become habitual over time. Inattention will predictably penalize the local
problem-solving community in the monitoring process in two ways. First is the
Madisonian penalty: higher-level monitors are likely to have a more extended,
less partial perspective than the locals, making them sympathetic to the
minority community and suspicious of decisional processes and solutions that
freeze it out. Second is the Deweyan reason: failing to tap the information and
proposals of each community affected by the public school system will keep
schools and districts from succeeding as well in meeting educational challenges
as comparable institutions that do tap those sources.
2 4 8
States like Kentucky and Texas and the federal No Child Left Behind Act
go even further. By demanding that results be publicly measured and reported
not only school-by-school but also for various subpopulations defined by race,
ethnicity, economic status, and special educational status, these regimes
explicitly design the monitoring structure to assure the broadening of interests
245. See supra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
246. See DEWEY, supra note 53, at 203; supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
247. THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, supra note 5, at 347-48 (James Madison); see supra notes 15-17 and
accompanying text; see also Grdinne de Bfirca, Reappraising Subsidiarity's Significance After
Amsterdam (1999), at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990701.html (discussing the core
"subsidiarity" principal adopted by the European Community, which requires the center to structure any
initiatives it adopts so that, consistent with the goal of solving the problem at issue, the initiative
maximizes the freedom of local entities to design and implement their own solutions).
248. See supra notes 88, 92 and accompanying text.
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that Madison hoped would be the "happy effect" of his national negative. 249
Instead of being expected to intuit, localities are informed by law that the effect
of their activities on each minority community will be a matter to which higher
level monitors will closely attend. No matter how parochial a locale's
governing majority, therefore, it will no longer be able to avoid exposure not
only of its purposeful "oppression" of minority children, but also of its passive
ignorance of their needs and of better practices for educating them that
experimentation can reveal. This evidently is what the Bush Administration had
in mind when it declared its "commitment" (through its adoption of the NCLB)
to "eliminate the achievement gap," rather than hiding it within statewide
averages, and in so doing to attack the "soft bigotry of low expectations."
250
2. Minimizing Workplace Discrimination
Today, much workplace discrimination takes forms that are difficult to
prove, or to classify as such even when all the facts are known. Typically,
actions that systematically disadvantage minorities and women are informal,
discretionary, and undocumented. Often, they are spread across a number of
supervisors and co-workers and occur in settings in which private employers
can hire and fire workers at will based on idiosyncratic evaluation methods,
performance standards, and workplace culture.25'
Actionable bias also frequently coincides with conditions-poor
management, erratic hiring practices, and odious employee behavior-that are
sub-optimal from a business perspective and ought to be cured along with bias
but are not legally actionable. 252 Under traditional rule-based enforcement
regimes, in which lists of particular illegal practices accrete slowly over time,
forbidden practices may not yet have joined the list when discrimination is
suspected, particularly in developing areas such as sexual harassment. In such
settings, employers worried that comprehensive solutions they adopt for both
the legal and business aspects of the problem may be legally unnecessary or
insufficient may choose to leave the problem unaddressed and hide any aspects
249. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 1, at 317, 318; Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16,
1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 382-84.
250. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., REACHING OUT... RAISING AFRICAN AMERICAN ACHIEVEMENT-No
CHILD LEFT BEHIND, http://www.nclb.gov/start/facts/achievement-aa.html (last visited July 30, 2002).
251. Sturn, supra note 49, at 466-75 (defining and describing first- and second-generation
employment discrimination).
252. Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 277, 281
("Organizational practices that create gender bias can also cause organizational dysfunction. Racial,
gender, and ethnic injustice may be best remedied by addressing these underlying institutional
arrangements .... Issues of racial and gender bias are deeply connected to other concerns such as health
and safety, worker participation, working conditions, and long term economic sustainability of a
community.")
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of it they fear could be actionable.253
As Professor Sturm has described in detail, the Supreme Court has
responded to this problem in the sexual harassment/hostile environment context
by establishing an enforcement regime that is strongly experimentalist and, in
the sense discussed above, Madisonian. 254 Absolving itself of the function of
listing the various hostile environments that do and do not violate Title VII's
prohibition of discrimination in the "terms [and] conditions ... of
employment, 2 55 the Court has ruled that "no single factor" is decisive256 and
has recognized an affirmative defense for employers who "exercise[]
reasonable care to avoid harassment and to eliminate it when it might occur.
' 257
The result is that employers seeking to avoid sexual harassment liability have
an incentive to devise their own codes of conduct and enforcement regimes to
curb sexual harassment and any associated practices they choose to tackle at the
same time. Along with intermediate actors such as insurance companies and
civil rights lawyers, courts monitor the plans to determine whether they meet
the "reasonable care" standard.258
In the shadow of the Supreme Court's decisions, companies seeking to
demonstrate reasonable care have adopted anti-discrimination regimes to break
patterns of workplace behavior that the companies believe are associated with
253. Sturm, supra note 49, at 475-78 (describing the limits of a "rule based" approach). Professor
Sturm explains:
In a rule enforcement process, problems tend to be redefined as discrete legal violations with
sanctions attached. Fear of liability for violation of ambiguous legal norms induces firms to
adopt strategies that reduce the short-term risk of legal exposure rather than strategies that
address the underlying problem. They accomplish this in significant part by discouraging the
production of information that will reveal problems, except in the context of preparation for
litigation. Under the current system, employers producing information that reveals problems
or patterns of exclusion increase the likelihood that they will be sued. Thus, lawyers counsel
clients not to collect data that could reveal racial or gender problems or to engage in self-
evaluation, because that information could be used to establish a plaintiff's case.
Id. at 476.
254. See id. at 479-89, 556-64.
255. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994); see Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786
(1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986).
256. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc, 523 U.S. at 81-82; Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc,
510 U.S. at 23; Sturm, supra note 49, at 480-82.
257. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. at 806 ("It would therefore implement clear
statutory policy and complement the Government's Title VII enforcement efforts to recognize the
employer's affirmative obligation to prevent violations and give credit here to employers who make
reasonable efforts to discharge their duty."); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,
764 (1998) (concluding that "Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment policies
and effective grievance mechanisms," so employers should be rewarded for efforts "to promote
conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context" and that "limiting employer liability" based on
reasonable efforts to head off violations "could encourage employees to report harassing conduct before
it becomes severe or pervasive") (citations omitted).
258. See infra notes 38 & 49 and accompanying text; cf Sturm, supra note 49, at 479 ("Although
the elements of this [new] structural approach have been set forth in recent cases, the Court hds not yet
fully articulated the conceptual framework that ties these elements together and explains their
significance.").
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sexual harassment and other gender- and race-focused bias. Although the
Supreme Court does not require companies seeking the "reasonable care" safe
harbor to publicize their plans, intermediate actors-insurance companies,
industrial psychologists, consultants, and civil rights lawyers-have developed
expertise in designing and implementing such regimes and thus informally pool
information among employers about effective techniques. 259 Employer activity
also may be monitored by groups of employees who serve on grievance
committees or operate hiring, career development and training programs, which
in addition provide auxiliary sites of innovation. 260 Although the EEOC has not
yet done so, it too could pool information, benchmark results, and identify best
practices.26 1
Of particular interest is the role played by civil rights lawyers. Given the
lawyers' familiarity with practices elsewhere, companies sometimes hire them
to draft anti-discrimination plans. Companies also achieve the same result
indirectly by agreeing to consent decrees in lawsuits the lawyers bring on
behalf of company employees.262 Often, these decrees are experimentalist in
263design. Pursuant to them, companies set targets for preferred outcomes,
monitor the success of different work sites in meeting the targets, benchmark
high performance levels and best practices tied to them, and oversee
modifications where performance is below par.264 The decrees may do double
duty as remedies for the mismanagement, ineffective hiring practices, and
inadequate supervision that accompany workplace bias.265 Courts remain on
call to monitor the decrees, or to step in when settlement efforts fail. But their
job is made easier by the framework such consent decrees provide, the
information they generate, and their elaboration of the "reasonable care"
259. See Sturm, supra note 49, at 524-30.
260. See id. at 530-35 ("By bringing together employees with common experiences, these
[employee] groups facilitate the identification of exclusionary patterns. They also enable employees to
interact with their employer as a group, which both elevates the urgency of responding and diffuses the
target of any retaliation.").
261. See id. at 551-53 (describing failures of the EEOC, but also how at least some local EEOC
offices have distributed model policies and taken a somewhat more structural perspective).
262. See id. at 527-30.
263. See id. at 563 & nn.367-68 ("[C]ourts have overseen the formulation, approval, and
implementation of consent decrees, some of which contain many of the characteristics of effective
problem-solving ... ").
264. See id. at 511-19 (describing a consent decree in which Home Depot agreed to (i) computerize
its promotion process so that the qualifications and job preferences of all employees seeking promotion
are available both to management when making training and promotions decisions and to class counsel
who has an ongoing role in monitoring compliance; (ii) track data on who is and is not eventually
promoted, with "trip wires" announcing a problem when qualified candidates are passed over; (iii)
monitor patterns by race and ethnicity of training provided, job preferences expressed, promotions
requested, job interviews granted, and promotions awarded; (iv) develop interview protocols to
minimize the "steering" of minority candidates; (v) adopt benchmarks for the inclusion of minorities in
various positions; and (vi) measure and improve the participation of minorities in employment decision
making).
265. See id. at 487-89 & n.92, 510-20.
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standard when considered in the aggregate. 266
The workplace discrimination context reveals how far public problem-
solving can carry equal protection beyond Madison's ambition while remaining
faithful to his structural approach. Under the Court's cases, it is mainly private,
market-oriented entities, not state legislatures, that are the local innovators.
And it is the national judiciary, supplemented by a variety of private
intermediaries, not Congress, that fills the role of central monitor. Still, the
Madisonian analogy holds. The national government uses local entities not
otherwise affiliated with it to implement its regulatory program by requiring
them to initiate their own solutions, subject to national oversight, under general
norms that are fleshed out over time by local experience. 267 As a result, the
"consultations" and "affections" of entities not otherwise likely to be
sympathetic to the national objective (here, freeing the workplace of gender and
race bias) are mobilized in service of the national goal.268
The Court's solution is doubly Madisonian. As noted, the Court has adapted
Madison's brand of cooperative federalism to a broad array of national and
local, public and private institutions. Moreover, the reason the Court has taken
these steps is to provide an "interior" or structural cure for defects Madison
presciently identified in the alternative, "exterior" or admonitory approach to
equal protection that was later adopted by the Fourteenth Amendment and its
allied civil rights acts.269 Recognizing the difficulty of judicially decreeing that
employers heed the "obscure and equivocal" words of Title VII's "parchment
barrier" to bias, 27  the Court has substituted structural mechanisms that
hardwire attentiveness to the interests of minority employees into businesses'
everyday operation. In other words, in the workplace discrimination context (as
also as in the public school context), at least part of the problem being solved,
in the course of which equal protection is assured, is equal protection itself.
266. See id. at 487-88. Police departments have begun to adopt similar remedial plans to head off
Justice Department investigations, settle civil rights litigation, or comply with state laws seeking to end
racial profiling and other abusive police practices. See Garrett, supra note 49, at 76-81, 92-95. These
plans typically rely on the collection of data regarding the race of people stopped by the police; a
problem-solving process for evaluating and responding to the data, including an "early warning" system
that identifies "problem" officers and precincts; and monitoring by participants at periodic public
meetings, outside overseers, or even civil rights groups. Id. at 81-96 (describing racial profiling consent
decrees governing the Los Angeles Police Department and the New Jersey State Police).
267. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection IV.C.4; supra notes 15-17 and
accompanying text.
268. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 5, at 296 (James Madison); see Madisonian Equal
Protection, supra note 1, at Subsection IV.C.4; supra notes 9-15.
269. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section V.B; supra Parts I-I.
270. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 1, at 295, 297; THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 5, at 229 (James Madison).
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IX. EVOLVING EQUAL PROTECTION
We have described how Madisonian and Deweyan equal protection
emerges from experimentalist remedies, but the question remains whether
experimentalism can better satisfy our modem equal protection commitments,
which may be more richly developed than both Dewey and Madison's
economized "interior" notions of equality and the "exterior" rigid, rule based
equal protection jurisprudence enforced tepidly by our federal courts. We
submit that, through the pragmatic approach described, experimentalist equal
protection can provide for more effective equal protection along all of the
dimensions that equality typically is conceived today, broadly grouping modem
theories of equality to include: (1) equality in results and in resources,271 (2)
equal concern and respect, or citizenship, 272 (3) equality of process and in
participation, 273 (4) equality through integration, 274and (5) anti-subordination 275
(including the notion that discrimination evolves and is cultural and context-
specific) 276 and stigmatic harm.
277
First, experimentalist equal protection aims at needs and at equality of
resources, opportunity and results in a way that our prior regimes never did,
more in line with Rawls's difference principle requiring that a rising tide lift all
boats, than the economized Madisonian conception of the common good.278 We
have described in the education context strong sanctions to prevent schools
from persistently lagging behind improvement and performance goals,
combined with information pooling and resource sharing in the form of grants
271. Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional
Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977); Michael Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of
Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977).
272. John Hart Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motivation Analysis, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1155,
1160 (1978); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-11 (1977) (proposing principle of equal citizenship
to guide equal protection doctrine).
273. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135-77 (1980) (describing representation of
minorities and participation in the political process as the central equal protection goal); see also
Liebman, supra note 10, at 1552-56.
274. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
275. Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1003, 1012-16 (1986).
276. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Standards of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1114 (1997) (arguing that status regulation and
discrimination evolve and that legal standards fail to keep pace); Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 355-56 (1987)
(advocating an equal protection test that would focus on not just racial stigma, but the "cultural
meaning" of the alleged racial discrimination).
277. Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 13-14,
34-35 (2000); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "'Bizarre Districts, " and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483
(1993).
278. See JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (rev. ed. 1999); Ronald Dworkin, What Is
Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981).
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that provide schools with the tools to remedy poor results. 279 In the workplace
discrimination context, incentive to avoid litigation encourages employers to
dedicate resources to grievance procedures, and to expand racial and gender
diversity in recruiting, career development, and training programs for
minorities. 28 More importantly, unlike traditional historically-bound
understandings of what the Equal Protection Clause requires, not only do
experimentalist remedies achieve better results and publicly measure how well
the needs of those worse off are met, the remedy does not end with remedying
past discrimination, but instead requires steady progress towards meeting and
then surpassing ameliorative goals.
Second, experimentalist equal protection aims at equal concern and respect,
through equality of participation in line with Dewey's optimism about human
potential and the potential of a truly public community. The approach thus
accomplishes Madison's "equal citizenship" goal, but in the more sociable
Deweyan manner of also making that citizenship meaningful by creating
regular opportunities for broad participation in community decisionmaking.
281
Third, as to political process and participation, the remedy precisely targets
what Madison diagnosed as the inability of our federal government to prevent
factional abuse at the local level and instead creates alternate structural
incentives to provide relief and actively enfranchises minority sub-populations
by soliciting their input and direct participation. Fourth, as to the theory that
integration should be the goal of equal protection, experimentalism promotes
integration in several senses; in diversity of participants in problem-solving
itself, in measuring the effects of the remedy and ensuring that it reaches all
disadvantaged sub-populations, and finally, as in the workplace context, the
remedy can include explicit benchmarking of efforts to diversity the subject-
institution.
282
Fifth, experimentalist equal protection hones in on discrimination that
would stand out as violating strict scrutiny, and indeed provides a scrutiny far
better informed where showing purposeful discrimination may be prohibitively
difficult,283 but on the other hand, experimentalist data collection and public
reporting requirements render transparent conduct of relevant actors that
systemically disadvantages any groups. The result better satisfies the anti-
subordination principle as well, by monitoring and making public whether any
group is persistently treated as "second-class citizens," and structurally
279. See supra Subsection VII.C.i.
280. See supra Subsection VII.C.2.
281. See Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91
HARV. L. REV. i, 60-62 (1977); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REv. 245, 247-49
(1983).
282. See supra note 264 (describing the Home Depot consent decree). See also Cynthia L. Estlund,
Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1 (2000).
283. See supra note 271.
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securing broad participation of minorities and benchmarks efforts to remedy
discrimination and poor performance. 284  The experimentalist programs
described adopt anti-subordination, race-conscious, affirmative, and remedial
norms far beyond what courts have been willing to require or adopt, and not
just to prevent discrimination, but for Dewey's and Madison's reason that
human potential and thus diversity, "offers new ideas and approaches that can
enhance institutions' capacity to perform and innovate."
285
Admittedly, experimentalism avoids the Supreme Court's focus on
uncovering stigmatic, race-based decision-making,286 and rejects the rigid
approach of exterior, command-and-control equal protection review in favor of
preventing such classification before the fact. Purposive discrimination will
prove far easier to uncover where public officials refuse to take action despite
public data putting them on notice that a group is systematically disadvantaged.
The approach involves people and communities interacting with each other to
develop new perceptions and remedies,287 and in doing so reaches more subtle
or intersectional types of discrimination288 and permits redefinition of norms
surrounding equality and identity, based on the notion that just as the problem
of discrimination is contextual and often rooted in particular groups and
practices, so must be the solution.
What might be of concern to those reluctant to give up on the rights and
rule-centered Fourteenth Amendment centered approach, is that in doing so,
much of the remedy does not look like a guarantee of equality per se, or any
like our equal protection jurisprudence. Instead the center often defines a
problem using more mundane needs-based goals, such as improving reading
comprehension in schools or reducing drop-out rates. The focus is on needs and
not on rights, a shift in focus that some commentators have feared will
undermine equality by distracting from the continuing centrality of race-and
sex-based discrimination in our culture (with others countering that it is better
to focus on needs and abandon an equal protection jurisprudence long unable to
284. Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2429-30 (1994).
285. Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative
Idea, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 953-99, 1003-08, 1025 (1996) (describing how despite the broad assault on
racial preferences, attention to diversity and inclusion provides for a better structured, participatory
workplace, especially given the demands of the modem workplace for on-the-job learning, adaptability,
diverse and creative problem-solving strategies, and for reaching diverse markets and populations).
286. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995) (rejecting "the surface
appeal of holding 'benign' classifications to a lower standard [of scrutiny]" and applying strict scrutiny
to federal affirmative action program); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989)
(applying strict scrutiny to an affirmative action program based on the theory that racial classifications
pose the central equal protection harm).
287. Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88
CAL. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (2000).
288. Lawrence, supra note 276, at 319; Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1297
(1991).
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remedy intractable problems).289 That long-standing critical theory and policy
debate is avoided, where experimentalist remedies exist alongside the Equal
Protection Clause, so nothing is lost. The experimentalist goal is "not to discard
rights but to see through or past them" 290 and to push forward equality
discourse by deconstructing and supplanting rigid, rule-based notions of what
equality and equal protection consists in, with a more powerful, contextual and
substance-focused approach.
On the other hand, the rights-based discrimination model illuminates that
race and sex remain salient categories, which must be attended to explicitly
through experimentalist remedial safeguards. Explicit benchmarking in
experimentalist remedies thus far has been as to equality of results, in attaining
performance goals, provision of pooled expertise and resources, and in
achieving diversity. Though experimentalist remedies, as described, provide for
broad participation and also an avenue for minorities who have little power to
command attention locally to have a more respected place in the central
monitoring agency's more "extended" constituency, the remedies do not
explicitly measure participation to assess whether minorities actually
meaningfully participate. Remedies up until now have simply required that
decisions be made in consultation with outside groups, in open meetings. The
only analysis of demographics of participants, how much they contribute, and
whether their input is considered and adopted, has been by scholars measuring
participation after the fact, and not in experimentalist regimes themselves.
291
That lack of explicit focus on participation values should be corrected.
289. See, e.g., PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 146-65 (1991); Gerald
N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991) (debunking the view that the Supreme Court and federal
courts were instrumental in securing civil rights, and questioning whether courts are an effective means
of securing change); DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 3 (1987) ("[T]he salvation of racial equality has eluded us again."); Kimberld W. Crenshaw,
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1376-81 (1988) (claiming that civil rights law has failed to remedy discrimination
and permits subordination of people of color); Susan Sturm, supra note 49, at 475-78 (expressing doubts
about the ability of courts, lawyers, and rule-based approaches generally to remedy employment
discrimination).
290. Strum, supra note 49, at 164.
291. Archon Fung conducted such demographic analysis of monthly community police-beat
meetings in Chicago and found, surprisingly, that wealth, class, and race did not correspond with
participation, and in fact many poor marginalized neighborhoods with less social capital had the greatest
success with community policing. See ARCHON FUNG, STREET LEVEL DEMOCRACY 30-50 (1999), at
http://www.archonfung.net/docs. Fung also found that in community school meetings, while African
American and Hispanic people may be less likely to vote, higher percentages of African American and
Hispanic parents participated in such meetings. Id. at 38. Fung noted the CHICAGO COMMUNITY
POLICING EVALUATION CONSORTIUM, COMMUNITY POLICING IN CHICAGO, YEAR FOUR: AN INTERIM
REPORT 130 (Illinois Criminal Justice Authority, 1997) stated "it is not the case that better-off places
with a home-grown capability for handling problems are also the beats where community policing is
working best... To the contrary, four of the most highly rated beats [in terms of community policing]
are to be found among those with relatively little community capacity." Thus, "Chicago reverses a
common pattern across the country, one in which participation in civic affairs and even crime prevention
is higher in better-educated, homeowning, and white neighborhoods." FUNG, supra, at 21.
Yale Law & Policy Review
Participation may often require shoring up through additional protections, as
"democratizing initiatives often encounter resistance from officials who are
reluctant to share authority or subject themselves to additional public
,,292scrutiny. Unless participation is measured and attended to, that crucial
feature of the remedy may languish. Experimentalist remedies should
benchmark the ability of an intermediate level monitor to secure participation
of minority groups; create chanisms sensitive to whether certain groups feel
excluded and the ability to remedy such exclusion and prevent perceptions of
exclusion; and develop measures of how meaningful minority participation is,
and how successful are efforts to prevent exclusion.
Further, in doing so a monitor must attend to difference, to affirmatively
welcome members of marginalized groups to participate, just as employers do
by making efforts to diversify job applicants, because otherwise they may feel
alienated from the process or remain skeptical that their input will be
considered.293 As Sturm and Guinier note:
Research consistently shows that ignoring patterns of racial and gender exclusion
causes these patterns to recur and dominate. A proven method of minimizing the
expression of bias in decision making consists of reminding decision makers of the
risk of bias or exclusion and requiring them to engage in fair, unbiased decision
making.
294
Experimentalist remedies should make use of ongoing efforts to create
further structural reminders preventing bias. This could take the form of
measuring participation by race to monitor exclusion combined with efforts at
maintaining diversity, adding grievance procedures as in workplace remedies,
and ensuring that problem-solving places a premium on diverse viewpoints.
Such efforts by a monitor should also remain contextual and focused on local
efforts to solve concrete problems. The diverse communities of people suited to
cooperate in solving problems of policing may be very different from those
suited to workplace, environmental, or education reform. 295 Different remedies
will call together different communities, but in each, explicit attention can be
paid to difference and inclusion.
This suggests additional accountability mechanisms can be continually
developed as best practices to monitor the monitor itself. Recall that Madison
placed too much confidence in the ability of Congress to free itself from
292. Archon Fung, Deliberation Where You Least Expect It: Citizen Participation in Government,
in CONNECTIONS 30-33 (Fall 2003).
293. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 285, at 1027 ("Many members of marginalized groups
predicate their willingness to participate in collaborative conversation on the majority's recognition of
the ongoing significance of group-based exclusion. For members of historically excluded groups, a
meaningful program of inclusion is a prerequisite to participating in ventures that benefit the whole
community.").
294. Id. at 1028.
295. "The role diversity plays in the functioning of particular institutions will vary, depending on
the institution's mission, demographics, and history. Diversity, like race, is not a static, fixed concept,
but rather one that takes on meaning in the context of particular circumstances and projects." Id.
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factional influence, particularly where the development of the two-party system
undercut the impartiality of the national government. As described, Madison
believed in redundant structural safeguards, like his Council of Revision, which
would serve as a meta-safeguard to guarantee the impartiality of Congress in its
exercise of the veto. Any monitor can fall victim to faction, but structural
mechanisms such as public reporting, participation and benchmarking can
diagnose and prevent such failures.
This discussion indicates one final area for future work, and that is
evaluating relative success of different monitors at achieving equal protection
goals, whether some monitors may be better suited to accomplish equality-
goals than others, and what kinds of safeguards best assure their success.
Experimentalist remedies described solicit interactive participation of different
and sometimes overlapping monitors, including state and national legislators,
judges, executive and administrative officers, and citizens. In each remedy
there is some center, and the ability of that monitor to collaborate with other
participants will in large part determine the success of the remedy. One concern
might be that in situations where the central agency is chiefly located in the
courts (for example, Kentucky school programs), and where the courts are still
chiefly motivated by "external" equal protection mandates, one might expect
less attention to informal patterns of discrimination, disparate impact, or other
local discrimination, than in situations where the central monitoring power is
located in an administrative body that explicitly benchmarks whether minority
sub-populations achieve better results (as the EEOC could do, but has not in the
employment context). Perhaps intermediate level monitors at the state level
may do a better job of reaching local patterns of discrimination than distant
federal monitors. Future work on best practices should critically examine the
relative empirical success of different monitors in including the concerns of
neglected local minorities and fostering their meaningful participation in
problem-solving efforts, whether courts, administrative agencies, legislatures or
other entities best serve as central monitors, and what characteristics and
practices account for their success. Similar work could focus on the roles of
stakeholding intermediate groups, such as citizens' groups, civil rights groups,
insurance companies, and public policy groups.
All of the above is to indicate that sustaining meaningful experimentalist
equal protection will require ongoing attention not just to remedial results
narrowly defined, but process-values and equal protection goals including those
of participation, inclusion, disparate impact on minority groups, avoiding
stigma, and whether minority needs are heard and redressed. What is so
significant about experimentalist equal protection, though, is that such
discussion and analysis of merits of different accountability mechanisms and
additional remedial safeguards can occur at all. Where so often in the past our
institutions have only rarely and grudgingly explicitly taken note of race,
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gender, or of any difference, more optimism may be possible in an
experimentalist regime, where better results across the board of attending to
inequality and securing broad participation can be measured and observed.
Problem-solving can push the evolution of equal protection norms and
remedies beyond rigid categories and past solutions. Experimentalism, because
it is data driven, creates the possibility for a deeper examination of the actual
workings and results of local solutions, and empirical evaluation of success in
achieving equal protection goals or whether discrimination or inequality
remains unseen by the central agency. Experimentalist equal protection will
continue to pose new ways of benchmarking or monitoring that can uncover
local discrimination more effectively, promising a rich and hopeful road ahead
in which we can progressively rethink and improve institutional design,
remedies and scholarship and theory of equal protection. That evolving process
will also bring together new problem-solving communities and perhaps also
something like what Dewey meant when he hoped his method could bring
together a "Great Community.
296
X. CONCLUSION
James Madison was right about the danger local majority oppression of
minorities poses to the stability of republics. "Injustice"-"the stronger
faction... readily unit[ing] and oppress[ing] the weaker"-remains the "mortal
disease" of democratic polities.297 Madison also was right that the problem
cannot be effectively solved through judicially enforced "exterior"
admonitions, for example, to forbear discriminating against minorities in the
workplace or to afford minorities the equal protection of the law. 298 For
Madison, we never should hope for equal protection to arise as an afterthought,
after state action runs its course and does its damage, cementing in place
factional control of a group or coalition, which courts can only dislodge with
great difficulty and at great political cost.
But Madison was wrong about his preferred structural, or "interior,"
solution to the problem: a power in Congress to negative state legislation in all
cases whatsoever.299 Madison himself had foreseen that members of Congress
acting without the veto would "too frequently display[] the character rather of
partisans of their respective States than of impartial guardians of a common
interest." 300 Yet, there is little reason to think members of Congress would have
296. See Liebman, supra note 57, at 290-93.
297. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 5, at 77 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 51,
supra note 5, at 320, 353.
298. See Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at Section V.B; supra Part I-II.
299. See supra Part I.
300. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 5, at 296-97 (James Madison); see Madisonian Equal
Protection, supra note 1, at Section IV.C; supra Part II.
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done better while exercising the veto. And as burdensome and impractical as
the veto would have been both for Congress and for state legislators, it still
would have left most discriminatory "expedients"-all save state
"laws"-outside the ambit of congressional control.30 1 Nor was Madison able
to explain to the satisfaction of his colleagues how continuous, cooperative
interaction between different levels and branches of government, as opposed to
their use merely to check and constrain each other, could inculcate equal
protection virtue among either local or national officials.
302
As we demonstrate here, however, all is not lost and there is much more to
gain. Recent developments in public administration reveal that Madison's veto
is not the only available "interior" remedy for the majority oppression to which
republics are prone, nor are only constitutional solutions within the range of
political and administrative practicality. On the contrary, something so humble
as practicality itself-the need for robust inter-governmental interaction to
solve otherwise intractable public problems-has driven a host of national,
state, and local agencies of government to adopt voluntarily modem-day
Madisonian equal protection.30 3 Tracking Madison's interactive federalism,
304
these agencies have concluded that the best available solution to an array of
public problems is what we call "democratic experimentalism." 305 Like
Madison's veto and other aspects of his cooperative federalism, these
experimentalist regimes rely on the supra-local definition of problems, local
innovation to solve them, supra-local review to keep the local solutions
accountable, supra-local use of the "local information" and "codes" obtained in
the review process to re-generalize the problem and desired solution, the
dispersion to other localities of information and codes generated elsewhere and
of the re-generalized statement of the problem and solution, additional local
innovation, and so on.306 Participation in this process, moreover, induces the
broadening changes in the habits and perspectives of cooperating state and
national problem-solvers that John Dewey's pragmatism made intelligible and
believable 150 years after Madison's efforts to explain the same
transformations had baffled his colleagues at the Convention.
It thus is the process of continuous cooperation in the defmition and
solution of problems large and small that itself leads "effectual[]" equal
protection to emerge.3°7 As Madison understood, this result is not the product
of "parchment" admonitions to respect thy neighbor nor of after-the-fact
301. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text, Madisonian Equal Protection, supra note 1, at
Section VII.B.
302. See id.
303. See supra Section VII.C.
304. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
306. See supra Parts V-VII.
307. See Letter to Thomas Jefferson (Sept 6, 1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, at 163.
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judicial wrist slapping when the admonitions are ignored.3 °8 But neither does
equal protection emerge, as Madison sometimes seemed to suggest, from an
Olympian perspective that the extended republic automatically bestows on
national legislators, and that the national negative would have foisted on state
legislators.
309
Rather, as Dewey recognized-albeit without Madison's knack for
embodying his psycho-social insights in practical governance structures-it is
the accountable problem-solving of Madison's cooperative federalism itself
that enhances interaction and respect between majority and minority. Because
local problem-solving in experimentalist regimes takes place under the
watchful eye of officials attuned to progressively more "extended"
constituencies, the likelihood of parochial majoritarian exclusion of local
minorities from the decision making process and from the range of interests
being considered is diminished-just as Madison foresaw. 310
More important, however, as Dewey theorized, is the fact that the central
monitor's focus of attention is on local success in defining and solving
problems, and that success is defined comparatively-by how much similarly
situated entities accomplish-creates even stronger dispositions towards equal
protection and respect. To attain success in such regimes, actual-not just
respectfully inquiring but productively extractive-attention must be paid to
those most victimized by the seemingly intractable problems at issue, who have
crucial information about how to define the problem and often have developed
suggestive strategies for moderating it; to people with ideas that have not been
tried before, who, as Dewey pointed out, are disproportionately likely to be
minorities and others outside the mainstream; lto the resources, techniques and
opportunities for cooperation offered by orthogonal disciplines, which often
serve different constituencies and take different perspectives from the
discipline that traditionally is in charge;312 and to solutions that have
unpredictably succeeded elsewhere, where constituencies and decision making
processes may be more open than those in the majority of locales where the
same problem has resisted solution.
Most important, finally, is the seamless way in which this problem-focused
process of learning what is wrong and how to fix it integrates local, central, and
distant participants, intermingles their various contributions, and synthesizes
innovations that are unrecognizable as any as the participants' original
308. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text; see also Madisonian Equal Protection, supra
note 1, at Section VII.B.
3 10. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
312. An example is the interaction of the helping and adversarial professions and of therapeutic and
coercive perspectives in developing treatment plans that are the core mechanism of drug courts and
problem-solving courts generally. See Doff & Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts, supra note 49, at 867.
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conception. Madison did not spell out what such a positive vision of democracy
would look like far beyond preserving the republic from dissolution, but Dewey
looked beyond survival and saw in this approach a true democratic community
and leaves us with a fundamental optimism about human potential in
democracy. Experimentalism suggests that equal protection and also liberty and
fraternity emerge out of a common enterprise, where equal protection, viewed
structurally, builds not as a constraint on democracy's turbulent excesses, but
from the means of everyday problem-solving of groups and institutions. That
way, equal protection norms, rules, and remedies may be defined not just by
law but by practice, beginning with the best practices that experimentation
suggests. What this suggests for governing institutions, is rather than a state
that is "only an umpire to avert and remedy trespasses of one group upon
another," the experimentalist method goes beyond merely "settling conflicts,"
such that through participatory problem-solving "a large public interest is
generated. ' 313 The "good state," "places a discount upon injurious groupings"
that engage merely in "negative struggle," and instead "facilitates mutually
helpful cooperations" and with the equal protection benefit, "creates respect for
others and for one's self."'3 14 At the limit, as Dewey prophesied, this
experimentalist process may transform a "Great Society"-a jumble of distinct
constituencies that are habitually antagonistic to each other or at best warily
respectful-into a "Great Community" defined by a common interest that its
members continuously hammer out through cooperatively designed solutions to
jointly specified problems.315
Given such an underlying notion of democracy, premised on participation
and a belief in common interest that may be constructed through
experimentation, it not surprising, therefore, in some of the best-developed of
these regimes-ones, for example, that seek to improve the instruction of poor
and minority school children, 316 diminish discrimination against women and
minority employees, 317 and discourage racial profiling and other police
abuses 318-the problem being solved and specified through this equally
protective process is equal protection itself.
319
313. See DEWEY, supra note 53, at 73.
314. Id. at 72.
315. DEWEY, supra note 53, at 146-47.
316. See supra Subsection VII.C. 1.
317. See supra Subsection VII.C.2.
318. See Garrett, supra note 49; Livingston, supra note 49.
319. See supra Part VIII.
